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Audit Case Number	00-PH-201-1002

TO: Malinda Roberts, Director, Office of Public Housing, Pennsylvania State Office, 3APH

FROM: David J. Niemiec, Acting District Inspector General for Audit, Mid-Atlantic, 3AGA

SUBJECT: Review of the Philadelphia Housing Authority's Police Department
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

This is our audit report on selected Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department activities.

We want to acknowledge the assistance provided by selected Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department officers, the Deputy Chief of Administration, and personnel from the Payroll and Human Resource Departments that helped facilitate our audit. Their assistance also helped us formulate recommendations for some of the conditions needing improvement at the Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department.

Within 60 days, please provide us with a status report on each recommendation in this report which covers either: (1) the corrective action taken; (2) the proposed corrective action and the date to be completed; or (3) why action is considered unnecessary. Also, please furnish us with copies of any correspondence or directives issued because of the audit.

Should your staff have any questions, please have them contact Thad Staniul, Assistant District Inspector General for Audit, at (215) 656-3401.

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Executive Summary

We conducted a review of the Philadelphia Housing Authority's police department. The review was undertaken to evaluate the propriety of the overtime payments that were made to its staff. As part of our review we also looked into the level of baseline police services being provided to the Housing Authority by the City of Philadelphia and attempted to relate those services to what should be provided under the terms of their Cooperation Agreement.

Police services need to be provided to the residents of the Philadelphia Housing Authority in a more organized, coordinated, and controlled fashion. While our review was conducted primarily to look into various complaints regarding the administration of overtime at the Authority's police department, it is apparent that there are some very fundamental matters affecting the management and operation of the police department that need to be addressed by the Housing Authority and the City of Philadelphia. In addition to the use of Drug Elimination Program funds, this includes the baseline police services that should be provided by the City under the terms of its Cooperation Agreement with the Authority.

Level of Baseline Services Should be Determined

While the City is responsible for providing Housing Authority residents with a certain level of police services under its Cooperation Agreement with the Authority, neither the Housing Authority nor the City know what level of services should be provided or the level of services that is being provided. As a consequence, the Authority's police department is providing a wide variety of services to its tenants, some of which are supplanting, not augmenting, services which should be provided by the City. There needs to be a clear delineation of the duties and responsibilities of both police departments. This is especially important because of the differing staff qualifications between organizations.

Better Controls Should be Established Over Some Police Activities

Given the size of the Authority's police department and the variety of undertakings in which it is involved, it is important that the police department strengthen substantially the controls over certain aspects of its operations. This includes establishing and following relevant policies and procedures governing its payment of overtime (to assure that it is properly authorized, supported, approved and paid) as well as its participation in activities (to assure they are directly related to Authority operations). We found that the police department paid certain officers noteworthy amounts of overtime even though pertinent records were not kept or maintained and that some officers participated in activities which had no apparent relationship to the Authority's operations or the provision of police services to its tenants. Finally, there were instances where the Authority's

use of Drug Elimination Grant funds was not consistent with its grant application.

Policies and Procedures
Need to be Implemented
and Followed

Our report contains a variety of recommendations that should be implemented if the Housing Authority's police department is going to function efficiently and effectively. Among those recommendations are that the Housing Authority collaborate with the City in determining a quantifiable and measurable level of baseline services to be provided by the City as well as develop and implement a plan to supplement those services. Additionally, the Authority needs to implement various policies and procedures to assure that the apparent abuse of overtime that occurred in the past does not recur, as well as to assure that Drug Elimination Grant funds are used for their intended purposes. Since payroll preparation was essentially a manual operation with frequent errors in the calculation of amounts due to employees, we believe the process should be automated to improve accuracy and efficiency.

Request for Comments

We discussed the draft findings with Authority personnel during the audit and at an exit conference with the Executive Director on June 7, 1999. On September 28, 1999, we provided copies of the draft report to the Executive Director. We requested comments by October 15, 1999. The Authority requested an extension for its response and we agreed. It provided its official written comments on October 29, 1999.

Authority's Comments

The Authority's response noted that the period covered by the audit occurred before the current administration took charge of the Authority. Upon taking charge, the current Executive Director recognized systemic problems in the Authority, including a history of mismanagement of its police department. Reforming and restructuring the Authority's Police Department was and remains a top priority for the Executive Director. In furtherance of the Executive Director's policy for refocusing the activities of its police department, the Authority hired a new Police Chief on June 11, 1999 to help implement a number of reforms. Also, in August 1999, the Authority's Police Department hired an official for its Integrity and Accountability Office, which has oversight of some of the issues raised in this report, including overtime usage and developing records management and retention systems.

OIG Evaluation of
Authority's Comments

The Authority noted that prior to receiving this report, it had already implemented a number of policies and procedures that address and remedy many of the issues we raised. In addition, it has taken steps to implement other recommendations we have made, including investigating the implementation of an automated payroll system.

We considered the Authority's comments in preparing the final report and incorporated excerpts as we deemed appropriate in the body of the report. We included the text of the PHA "response", without the attachments, as Appendix A. Its complete response, including attachments, is available from our office.

We made changes to our report based on the Authority's comments. The actions taken as described in its written response, allowed us to close recommendations 2B, 2C, 2H, 2S, 3A and 3D. The Authority's response indicated that it has begun actions to address the majority of the remaining open recommendations. Our evaluation of its proposed actions suggested they would satisfy the recommendations.

One matter on which we disagree with the Housing Authority concerns the use of Drug Elimination Grant funds to hire additional police officers. The Authority explained that it was not able to maintain its base level of Authority police officers because of recruiting and funding difficulties. However, despite the recruiting and funding difficulties, the Authority employed officers in the drug elimination area up to the limits of the drug elimination funding. Drug Elimination Program openings would often be filled by transferring an officer from its operating budget to the drug elimination area because drug elimination was viewed as one of its highest priorities.

We maintain that Drug Elimination Grant funded positions were to be in addition to the normal base level of Authority police officers. In our opinion, hiring officers for, or transferring officers to Drug Elimination Program funded positions, while there was a shortage of officers for regular Authority police department duty, would not constitute additional police services above those provided by the existing Authority police.

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Abbreviations

ATF	Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
ACC	Annual Contributions Contract
BNI	Bureau of Narcotics Investigation
CAG	Comprehensive Assistance Grant
CDBG	Community Development Block Grant
CLO	Court Liaison Officer
DAR	Daily Attendance Report
DA	District Attorney
DEG	Drug Elimination Grant
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
FY	Fiscal Year
HOME	Home Investment Partnerships Program
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OS	Operating Subsidy
PD	Police Department
PHA	Philadelphia Housing Authority
PHAPD	Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department
HUD	US Department of Housing and Urban Development
VR	Vacancy Reduction

Introduction

The City of Philadelphia's obligation to provide police services to the residents of public housing is part of its Cooperation Agreement with the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA) that was executed on May 19, 1950. This Agreement provides that the City, without cost or charge to the PHA, will furnish or cause to be furnished to the PHA's tenants, the same public services and facilities which are being furnished without cost or charge to other dwellings and inhabitants of the City. These services include police and health protection.

The PHA created its own police department (PHAPD) in February 1979 because the PHA wanted to provide the residents of public housing greater security and protection than they were getting from the Philadelphia Police Department (City PD). Since that time, the PHAPD has emerged as a full force police department with duties similar to the municipal police, such as making arrest and conducting investigations. Today, the PHAPD consists of approximately 317 total personnel, of whom 182 are police officers. The remainder are supervisors, detectives, dispatchers, clerical and lobby monitor personnel.

According to a 1997 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the PHAPD and the City PD, the PHAPD is to supplement the City's police coverage provided for under the Cooperation Agreement. The City PD is to retain primary responsibility for investigating all homicides, rapes, felonies and misdemeanors. The MOU did not reduce existing City PD responsibilities at public housing developments, including responding to 911 calls. Neither the MOU nor the Cooperation Agreement stipulate, in quantitative and measurable terms, the level of baseline services the City PD is to provide PHA residents.

Audit Objectives

Our initial audit objective was to evaluate the propriety of the overtime payments that were made to the PHA's police department staff. As our review progressed, it became necessary to inquire into other areas of operations, including the level of baseline police services being provided to the PHA by the City of Philadelphia and matters that arose with respect to the use of Drug Elimination Grant (DEG) funding.

Audit Scope and Methodology

In conducting our review, we examined related PHA policies, procedures, records, and agreements and interviewed PHA personnel. We also met with staff from and examined records maintained by other organizations with which the police department dealt to obtain needed documents and information.

Our review was conducted between May 1998 and July 1999 and focused on transactions that occurred between 1995 and

1997. When appropriate, the review was extended to include other periods.

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PHAPD Resources Used to Provide Baseline Police Services at PHA Developments

Tenant safety and security are integral parts of PHA operations. HUD and Federal Law Enforcement organizations have devoted, and continue to devote, substantial resources to address criminal activity in and around public housing locations. In Philadelphia, both the City and the PHA, with HUD funding assistance, have important roles in maintaining a safe living environment for PHA residents.

The City’s obligation to provide police services to the residents of public housing is part of the Cooperation Agreement it executed with the PHA on May 19, 1950. This agreement provides that the City, without cost or charge to the PHA, will furnish or cause to be furnished to the PHA’s tenants, the same public services and facilities which are being furnished without cost or charge to other dwellings and inhabitants of the city. These services include police and health protection.

The PHA created its own police department in February 1979 because the PHA wanted to provide the residents of public housing greater security and protection than they were getting from the Philadelphia Police Department (City PD). Since that time, the PHAPD has emerged as a full force police department with duties similar to the municipal police, such as making arrests and conducting investigations.

PHAPD Resources

Today, the PHAPD consists of approximately 317 personnel, of whom 182 are police officers. The remainder are supervisors, detectives, dispatchers, clerical and lobby monitor personnel. The following schedule displays a four year history of the substantial resources the PHA budgeted for tenant safety and security:

Program	1995	1996	1997	1998
OS ^{1/}	\$8,218,233	\$8,234,938	\$8,551,710	\$8,735,534
DE ^{2/}	\$2,641,125	\$2,642,750	\$2,784,420	\$4,934,280
CA ^{3/}	\$6,387,670	\$7,042,697	\$10,785,329	\$3,650,000
VR ^{4/}	\$ 853,932	-	-	-
Total	\$18,100,960	\$17,920,385	\$22,121,459	\$17,319,814

^{1/} Operating Subsidy ^{2/} Drug Elimination ^{3/} Comprehensive Assistance ^{4/} Vacancy Reduction

City PD Responsibilities to the PHA

The creation of the PHAPD did not lessen the City PD’s responsibility for servicing PHA developments. The City PD is to provide the same baseline services to public housing residents as it provides to all other residents in its jurisdiction.

Baseline services, as defined by HUD in the Notice of Funding Availability for the Drug Elimination Grant (DEG) Program, are the deployment of city and county-wide police resources, to respond to crime and other public safety incidents, including 911 communications, processing calls for service, routine patrol, police officer response to calls for service and investigative follow-up of criminal activity.

PHAPD/City PD
Memorandum of
Understanding

According to a 1997 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the PHAPD and the City PD, the PHAPD is to supplement the City PD's coverage provided for under the Cooperation Agreement. The City PD is to retain primary responsibility for investigating all homicides, rapes, felonies and misdemeanors. The MOU did not reduce existing City PD responsibilities at public housing developments, including responding to 911 calls.

Level of Baseline Service
Not Defined

Neither the MOU nor the Cooperation Agreement stipulate, in quantitative and measurable terms, the level of baseline services the City PD is to provide PHA residents. As a consequence, the PHAPD does not have a standard against which to measure the actual City PD performance. We found that PHAPD services, in large measure, were taking the place of, rather than supplementing, some baseline City PD services. The PHA has been aware of this situation for some time. In a 1980 memorandum to the PHA Executive Director, the PHA's General Counsel noted that the PHA had been forced to assume the role of police in the developments and that this extra service had added to an already overburdened PHA budget. Also, a 1992 memorandum from the Chief of the PHAPD to the PHA Executive Director explained that "the Philadelphia Police Department, while mandated to provide protective services to all citizens and property in the City of Philadelphia, does not routinely patrol various developments. While supposedly required to respond to emergency calls from the sites, the Philadelphia Police Department does not always so respond. In fact, they refer all such calls to the PHAPD radio room for service and will only respond if notified that the PHAPD cannot handle the job."

Consultant Findings on PHAPD Operations

More recently, TAG Associates, a consultant the PHA hired to review overall operations, issued a draft report dated August 1998 that included findings on the PHAPD. One issue the draft report raised was the lack of City PD presence in the PHA developments. TAG Associates recommended that the PHA use its police for above baseline services and not replace the City for 911 and routine patrol services. The consultant noted that since PHAPD duplicates many of the services provided by the City PD, the City PD continues to remove themselves from public housing. Consequently, the PHAPD community policing suffers because they are responding to service calls that should be provided by the City PD.

PHAPD Response to Consultant Findings

An Acting PHAPD Chief (temporarily detailed from the City PD) in an August 26, 1998 response to the TAG Associates report acknowledged that the City PD does not have specific units dedicated to public housing. He noted that “on some occasions the City PD will forward a 911 call to our officers [the PHAPD], but in the vast majority of cases we are answering calls for service that come to our radio room and in some incidents officers will encounter an incident or make a sight arrest.” We learned from a PHAPD supervisor that many tenants call the PHAPD for service directly because tenants know, through experience, they will get a faster response time from PHAPD officers than they will from the City PD.

City PD 911 Referrals to PHAPD

Our review substantiated the large volume of calls for police services received by the PHAPD. During 1998, the City PD referred thousands of 911 calls to the PHAPD for service, though the PHAPD did not respond to all the 911 referrals. PHAPD personnel said that 75 percent of the 911 calls they responded to were answered solely by the PHAPD officers. Our review confirmed this condition. A sample of 911 calls we reviewed found that 85 percent of the calls were responded to by PHAPD officers. There were even instances where the City PD referred 911 calls to the PHAPD for service that had nothing to do with PHA developments.

PHAPD Resources Used to Provide Baseline Services

For years, the PHA has been spending its funds to provide tenants with the baseline police services each PHA tenant is

entitled to receive at City expense. Had the City fulfilled its obligations to the PHA, and provided baseline police services, the PHAPD's resources could have been used to greater effect by supplementing the City PD's services. The PHA could have also used some of these resources for housing operations.

Option - PHAPD Operating with City PD Oversight

The PHA's Executive Director told us that his background, skills, and interests are in the housing business and not the police business. Because of the City PD's expertise, the PHA Executive Director has suggested the City PD take over the PHAPD. The PHA would continue to fund the City PD the cost of the housing police. This option could cause the PHAPD to become a more effective organization due to the organizational strength and managerial skills of City PD personnel. However, this course does not address the central issue of getting the City PD to provide PHA developments with baseline police services. So, though the City PD may be able to use PHAPD resources more effectively than had been administered by the PHAPD, the PHA will, in effect, continue to pay the City for police services which the City is already obligated to provide to the PHA's tenants.

PHAPD Resources Should Supplement Baseline Services

The funding that HUD provides for PHA safety and security should be used to provide services above baseline and not to provide baseline services. The terms of both the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) and Cooperation Agreement give HUD a cause of action against the PHA, the City, or both, if either or both fail to comply with their obligations under the Cooperation Agreement. Further, court decisions have held that a public housing authority can bring mandamus against a local governing body to do what is necessary under the Cooperative Agreement. While bringing mandamus against the City to get it to honor the terms of the Cooperation Agreement may be contentious and painful to pursue, it may become the only course open to the PHA to get the City to provide residents with the police services they deserve.

PHA's Comments

The PHA concurred that during the 1995-1997 audit period, there was no accurate degree of measurement on what baseline services the City PD was to provide to PHA residents, what

services were actually being provided to PHA residents, or what call for service the City PD was responding to in PHA facilities. On taking office in March 1998, Mr. Greene identified these deficiencies and charted a course of action to remedy the problems.

The PHAPD has communicated with City PD officials to establish a quantifiable definition of the “baseline services” the City PD is to provide PHA residents as well as a framework to maintain and monitor these services. Also, the PHA has submitted to the City PD a draft updated Memorandum of Understanding for Coordination of Law Enforcement Responsibilities that includes a delineation of services between the City PD and the PHAPD.

The current administration has addressed further the issue of City PD services by commissioning a consultant to report on City PD involvement in PHA facilities. The PHA responded to the consultant’s findings by implementing a number of programs and policies discussed in this response, and hiring an experienced law enforcement officer as the new Chief of the PHAPD to help develop, refine and implement these programs and policies.

Under the new Chief, the PHAPD is implementing site-based policing which supplements, as opposed to supplants, the baseline services that the City PD is providing PHA residents. Also, because the PHA operating budget cannot support both core services, such as PHA facilities maintenance, and public safety services, such as a full service police department like the PHAPD, the PHA is shifting from a “full-service” police department to a “targeted” department that will supplement City PD services.

The PHA reported it will or has taken the following actions in answer to the finding recommendations:

- 1A. A draft updated MOU has been submitted to the City that will establish a quantifiable and measurable level of baseline police services the City PD will provide to PHA residents. The updated MOU will be entered between the PHA and the City of Philadelphia and will supersede the MOU from the previous administration.

- 1B. Effective January 2000, the City PD will be able to electronically provide the PHAPD with the calls for service and founded Part I (indictable offenses) and Part II (misdemeanors) crimes and/or arrests on PHA properties.
- 1C. The PHAPD will supplement City PD services by deploying site-based policing, along with specialized units (ACT teams, PHAPD Drug Task Forces, etc.) to curtail any quantitative problems identified from the information received from the City PD.
- 1D. It is premature to consider legal remedies to enforce the City’s responsibility to provide “baseline services” to PHA residents, as there is not measurable definition of “baseline services” that the City may or may not be providing.

OIG Evaluation of
PHA’s Comments

The PHA agreed with the conditions cited in the finding. Its proposed actions appear effective and satisfy the recommendations to establish quantifiable and measurable baseline City PD police services, to monitor PHA receipt of City PD baseline services, and to plan using HUD funds to supplement baseline services. We will keep recommendations 1A, 1B, and 1C open until such time as the PHA completes the proposed actions and submits to HUD documentation acceptable to show the proposed actions have been done.

At this point recommendation 1D is premature. However, we present this recommendation to show the PHA has a potent option at hand in the event that PHA monitoring evidences the City PD is not fulfilling its measurable and quantifiable baseline service responsibility to the PHA’s tenants.

Recommendations

We recommend that HUD direct the PHA to:

- 1A. Collaborate with the City to determine a quantifiable and measurable level of baseline police services the City PD will provide to PHA developments. The level of City police services to PHA developments must be comparable in quantity and quality to the police services provided to other residents of the city.
- 1B. Monitor whether or not the City PD is providing the baseline police services.

If the City PD is providing the baseline services:

- 1C. Establish a plan to use the HUD funding to supplement baseline services.

If the City PD does not provide baseline police services:

- 1D. Take legal action to obtain the services from the City, or explore, with HUD, other ways to obtain compliance, i.e., withholding CDBG, HOME or other types of Federal funding from the City.
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Better PHAPD Overtime Controls Are Needed

We reviewed the way the PHAPD authorized, justified, approved and supported the payment of overtime to its staff. We wanted to determine if the PHAPD had established effective overtime controls and if the controls were working satisfactorily. Our review was undertaken because of concerns that were raised about the way overtime was being administered by the PHAPD and covered overtime activities during Fiscal Years 1995, 1996, and 1997. The PHA has since taken action to significantly reduce the amount of overtime worked by its police department. However, we still believe a number of actions should be taken to help prevent the types of problems we observed from recurring.

We concluded that the PHAPD did not have effective controls and accountability over overtime. The preponderance of overtime was worked by a limited number of individuals and most of the overtime was either inadequately or improperly authorized, justified, approved or supported. Therefore, we believe the PHAPD lacked sufficient evidence to show that some of its officers were providing the level of services for which they were being compensated.

In the following sections to this finding, we discuss the types of problems that exist in the PHAPD's administration of overtime and the controls that should be established to help prevent them from happening again. We talk about how overtime was distributed to employees, management's oversight and accountability, and the types of errors that were made in calculating overtime wages. Because PHAPD overtime was poorly managed, we question whether the residents of the PHA received the type and amount of services to which they were entitled.


A. PHAPD Distribution of Overtime

Labor is the single largest cost of the PHAPD and overtime wages were a significant component of labor during the period covered by our review. Overtime increased from \$1 million in 1995 to \$19 million in 1996, and to over \$2.3 million in 1997. In just two years, PHAPD overtime grew by 135 percent. PHAPD overtime was financed with Operating Subsidies, as well as Comprehensive Assistance and Drug Elimination Program Grants.


Controlling PHAPD Overtime

To control PHAPD's growing overtime expenditures the current PHA Executive Director implemented a policy whereby all requests for PHAPD overtime or compensatory time had to be approved in advance by the PHA's Executive Office. As depicted in the following graph, this action reduced overtime payments by 62 percent between 1997 and 1998.

Sample Selection and Data Sources




Our audit focused on the 30 PHAPD employees who received the greatest amounts of overtime and compensatory time between 1995 and 1997. Most of these employees were PHA police officers, but some were supervisors, one was a dispatcher and another was a detective. Our test period for the officers, the dispatcher and detective amounted to 15 weeks of the 156 week period. We used available PHAPD records to determine why the PHAPD incurred the overtime during the 15 sample weeks. The Daily Attendance Report (DAR) is the PHAPD’s primary information document in accounting for PHAPD personnel payroll. The categorization of overtime in our sample follows:



Our sample amounted to approximately eight percent of the officers, dispatchers and detectives employed by the PHAPD. This small number of employees received a relatively large share of the overtime:

PHAPD Overtime Distribution



The PHAPD did not have a policy to achieve an equitable allocation of overtime amongst its staff or to restrict the number of hours an officer could work in a day or a week. Also, the PHAPD union contract was silent regarding these issues. PHAPD records did not explain why such a large volume of overtime was concentrated in so few PHAPD personnel.

Disproportionate Overtime Earnings

Many of the PHAPD personnel in our sample doubled and tripled their annual base pay with the overtime they received. Sometimes, officers claimed so many overtime hours that overwork was likely to adversely affect their abilities to perform satisfactorily. We found occasions where officers asserted they worked impossibly long hours of consecutive service. For example, two officers reported working 63 straight hours over a three day period with only a one hour break between the 47th and 48th hours. These same officers reported working entire weeks without a single day's rest.

Mandatory Rest Periods

The State of Pennsylvania recognized that working long hours can impede a police officer's effectiveness. Therefore, the State prescribed that for First Class Cities such as Philadelphia, police officers must be allowed at least 24 consecutive hours of rest in every calendar week. This mandatory rest period was established to prevent problems that could arise by having police officers work long overtime hours while armed.

PHAPD Needs Fair Overtime Distribution

Without a policy explaining how overtime would be fairly allocated and procedures to assure the policy was working effectively, the PHAPD lacked and still lacks adequate management controls to properly administer its payroll system.

The absence of a policy coupled with the manner in which overtime had been approved, helped to concentrate overtime in a small number of officers who doubled and tripled their annual base salaries, while the larger portion of PHAPD employees received little or no overtime. Further, while the PHAPD's policy provided that detectives, as well as supervisors, were entitled to compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay for hours worked beyond the normal workday, we identified one exception to this policy. The former PHAPD Chief authorized one detective to receive overtime pay in lieu of compensatory time and, as a result, the detective received overtime compensation of \$10,403 beyond what the detective would have received as compensatory time. We found no documentation which justified waiving the PHAPD policy in this case or that the waiver was approved by the PHA's Board of Commissioners.

PHA's Comments

The PHA agreed that there was a break down in controls over how overtime was granted during the audit period, but as a direct result of the new policies and stronger leadership of the PHA, overtime payments have dramatically decreased, as noted in the report.

In addition to new controls, the present administration has taken action against a PHAPD employee who was falsifying Daily Attendance Reports (DARs) to obtain overtime payments, as well as a supervisor who approved the DARs. The investigation, conducted by the PHA OIG, resulted in the termination of the employee. The supervisor is no longer with the PHA.

The PHA reported it has taken or will take the following actions in response to the finding recommendations:

2A: The PHA has implemented a policy providing that PHAPD overtime will not be issued unless personally approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources.

Due to the nature of law enforcement work, generally, it is difficult to formulate a policy concerning the equitable distribution of overtime. However, the PHA will be

tracking overtime and compensatory time to spot trends in distribution, and will review its policies on an ongoing basis.

A follow-up audit will be scheduled in the PHA OIG's Audit Plan for Fiscal Year 2001 to evaluate corrective actions taken by the PHAPD on overtime.

The PHA agrees with the OIG recommendation to implement a policy requiring mandatory rest periods for officers and limits the number of consecutive hours that PHAPD officers can work.

OIG Evaluation of
PHA's Comments

We acknowledge the PHA for recognizing the controls needed to ensure the PHAPD runs effectively and efficiently. While the current PHA administration has provided for the proper authorization and approval of overtime, we remain concerned by the lack of officer and supervisor certifications for overtime claims which we often found lacking in the documents we reviewed. We expect the PHA processing of overtime will ensure that all required certifications will be entered on the appropriate documents.

We concur with the PHA's tracking of overtime and compensatory time to spot trends in distribution. However, the PHA believed that it was difficult to formulate a policy concerning the equitable distribution of overtime. We also recognize that much of the overtime worked by PHAPD officers is beyond the control of their supervisors. However, we believe the PHAPD can establish a policy for distributing discretionary overtime, such as filling in for officer absences, working special details, or other events, where supervisors have notice of the overtime need and discretion regarding who they assign for the overtime. We believe the PHAPD should establish a policy as to how discretionary overtime will be distributed to achieve a fairness in overtime opportunities for willing officers.

Recommendation

We recommend the PHA:

- 2A. Establish a policy that will provide for an equitable distribution and payment of overtime to PHAPD personnel. The policy should provide for: the payment of overtime only when it is properly authorized, supported, approved and certified as being worked by the employee and supervisor; the approval of overtime by a person at a higher level than the person's supervisor; mandatory rest periods for officers and limits to a safe level of the number of consecutive hours that can be worked by PHAPD officers; regular periodic reviews of overtime by the PHA's OIG; and the recovery of overtime payments from the affected individuals when the payments are not properly authorized, approved, or otherwise supported.

B. Oversight and Accountability for PHAPD Overtime

The PHAPD had limited or ineffective controls and systems for managing, record keeping, accounting, supporting, and computing overtime for its police officers. Because of these weaknesses, we can not provide assurance that all the overtime paid by the PHAPD was:

- legitimate in many instances because of missing and altered documents
- justified and contributed to the protection of the PHA residents
- an effective use of PHAPD resources, and
- reasonable and limited to the time needed to effectively facilitate police duties.

The descriptions of the accountability and control conditions we observed for the various overtime categories follow.

COURT APPEARANCES

Officers make court appearances in response to subpoenas. Often, PHAPD officers received overtime compensation for court appearances. Eighteen percent, or \$25,134, of our sample involved overtime for court appearances. Although the PHAPD had controls for managing this type of overtime, the absence of needed documents precluded sufficient testing to assure the effectiveness of the controls. Using documentation available from other sources caused us to question whether some of the court appearance overtime claimed by PHAPD officers was justifiable.

Good PHAPD Controls for Court Appearances

The PHAPD had procedures for managing court appearances by its officers. If implemented, the procedures appeared to provide effective controls and included a separation of duties, documentation, and supervisory oversight. The procedures consisted of :

- A District Attorney (DA) issuing a subpoena to the PHAPD for an officer to appear in court.
- The PHAPD Court Liaison Officer (CLO) creating a court notice in four parts - two copies to the subpoenaed officer, one for the officer's supervisor/sergeant, one copy for the CLO.
- The officer taking one copy to court and having it time stamped in. After completing the court appearance, the DA would sign and note the time on the notice. Upon leaving the court house, the officer would again have the court notice time stamped out.
- The officer submitting the completed court notice to the officer's supervisor who is responsible for assuring it is complete, and the time spent on the court appearance is reasonable.
- The supervisor forwarding the court notice to the CLO. The CLO assures there is a subpoena to support the court notice.

Scope of Review for Court Appearance Overtime

We reviewed 283 overtime charges for court appearances to determine if the overtime paid to the officers as shown by the payroll records was adequately supported. Also, we wanted to assure there were subpoenas for the days overtime was claimed, together with court notices signed by the DA and showing the time stamped in and out. Finally, we wanted to confirm that supervisors reviewed the records to assure they were in order and that they supported the overtime that was paid to the officers.

Supporting Documents Mistakenly Discarded

We asked the CLO for the subpoenas and court notices that supported the overtime charges in our sample. The CLO did not have the subpoenas or court notices for any of the 283 overtime charges for court appearances. He said that all the subpoenas, court notices and schedules he prepared to summarize court appearances by PHAPD officers had been thrown away by mistake. Without the court notices, we lacked the means to verify the accuracy of the court appearance

overtime that was claimed. However, we could still confirm whether or not the officers were subpoenaed for court appearances in other ways.

Alternative Sources of Support

The Offices of the District Attorney and the Clerk of Quarter Sessions maintain court case files. We reviewed 10 court case files that made up 11 of the court appearances in our sample. The files maintained by the District Attorney and the Clerk of Quarter Sessions contained identical information and supported the same 3 subpoenas out of the 11 court appearances claimed by officers. Though the other 8 files did not evidence subpoenas being issued to the PHAPD officers, we confirmed the case was in session for 7 of the other 8 court appearances in which the officers claimed overtime. The claim for court appearance overtime in the eighth instance appeared to be in error since the case was not in session on the day overtime was claimed.

Alternative Sources Indicate Incorrect Overtime Charges

The PHAPD did not have documentation to support the court appearance overtime paid to its officers. However, our very limited review of related documents from other sources caused us to question whether the PHAPD officers were correct in all their claims for court appearance overtime.

PHA's Comments

The PHA said it has taken or proposes to take the following actions in response to the finding recommendations:

2B: The PHA has created and tasked the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office with developing a records management and retention policy which will require court appearance documents related to overtime payments to be maintained for five (5) years.

2C: The PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office has assigned a detective and paralegal to review periodically documentation supporting court appearances by monitoring the administrative process of the Court Liaison Unit. Furthermore, the PHA OIG will schedule a follow-up audit in its Audit Plan for Fiscal Year 2001 to evaluate the corrective actions taken by the PHAPD on overtime. This will include

reviews of the DARs and other records as is necessary to justify and document PHAPD overtime charges.

OIG Evaluation of
PHA's Comments

The PHA's document management and retention policy is adequate to safeguard court appearance records and satisfies our recommendation 2B which we will record as final action completed in our Audits Management System. Further, though the PHA response did not specifically cite court subpoenas as one of the documents it would retain, we want the PHA to ensure that subpoenas are retained since these externally generated documents can validate the internal records of court appearances.

The court appearance monitoring to be done periodically by a detective and a paralegal assigned by the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office and future audits of PHAPD overtime by the PHA OIG effectively address our recommendation that there be independent reviews of documentation supporting court appearance overtime. Therefore, we will enter final action completed and close recommendation 2C in our Audit Management System.

Recommendations

We recommend that you advise the PHA to:

- 2B. Review the PHAPD's records management and retention policy to preclude the possibility of other records being accidentally thrown away.
- 2C. Direct the PHA IG to periodically review documentation supporting court appearance overtime by:
 - 1) Examining court appearance documentation to assure it includes a subpoena and court notice containing in and out time postings and the DA's signature and manual time posting.
 - 2) Verifying that the overtime claimed by the officer on the DAR is supported and reasonable according to the time in and out information on the court notice.

PROCESSING ARRESTS

In the event PHAPD officers are involved in an arrest, they process the arrest through a City police station. PHAPD involvement in processing arrests resulted in significant overtime. Overtime incurred in processing arrests represented 11 percent, or \$14,757, of our overtime sample. PHAPD officers did not enter data on control documents to show the time spent in processing arrests and its supervisors failed to enforce this reporting requirement. As a result, the PHAPD lacked documentation to monitor officer performance and support the reasonableness of the time spent by officers in processing arrests.

Supporting Arrest Processing Times

For any arrest, complaint or service requiring police action, the officer prepares an incident report Form 75-48. The 75-48 requires the officer to enter various facts about the incident. The 75-48 also requires the officer to show the time out, which is the time the officer goes off duty to process the incident, and the time-in, which is the time the officer finishes processing the arrest or complaint. The arrest processing takes place at a City police station. Often, the time used to process the incident goes beyond the officer's normal work hours and results in overtime. The officers submit the incident reports to their supervisors for review. The incident report will show how much time was taken by the District to process the arrest. The supervisor can use the incident report to establish the accuracy and reasonableness of the overtime claimed by the officer on the DAR.

Our review of incident reports showed that the officers responsible for completing the reports rarely entered their time-in when they finished processing the arrest. The officers disregarded entering this data and the PHAPD supervisors, responsible for oversight, did not enforce this reporting requirement. Consequently, data, useful for monitoring officer performance and supporting overtime, was unavailable.

PHAPD Arrest Processing Times Varied Widely

Our review of the overtime incurred by officers for arrest processing showed that it varied widely from officer to officer. We found instances where the processing of an arrest took three hours, while the processing of another arrest took over eight hours. We wanted to learn why there were wide differences in processing times, and if the processing times claimed on the DARs could be supported.

Because processing times were not entered on the incident reports, we could not use the reports to confirm the arrest processing overtime claimed by officers. As an alternative, we reviewed City PD information regarding PHAPD arrest processing. We wanted to learn the time when the arrest processing for an incident was completed. The City PD told us that the slate time, or booking time, was the time that the arrest processing was completed and that shortly after the slate time, the officer should have reported back on duty at the PHAPD.

We asked the City police department for slating time information for 25 arrests on which PHAPD officers made 63 charges for overtime. In each case, the processing time of the arrest exceeded seven hours. City PD staff said that, typically, one officer is sufficient to process an arrest. It was unusual for more than two since only the officers who have important testimony for processing by the City PD detective are necessary to stay through the end of processing. However, we found occasions when as many as four PHAPD officers charged overtime to process one arrest.

No Justification for Long Arrest Processing Times

City PD staff said that giving consideration for administrative chores, it was reasonable to expect an officer to return to duty within one and half hours of the slating time. Even after allowing officers three hours from slate time for other administrative requirements, we found 18 of the 63 instances in our sample where the officer claimed overtime on the DAR that was more than three hours after the slate time. No justification was documented by the officers for taking so long to return to service. Further, since the slating information was not provided to PHAPD supervisors, they would not have arrest processing completion times to compare to the overtime claimed in the DAR.

PHA's Comments

The present PHA administration has tasked the PHAPD to establish protocols and procedures to ensure that officers prepare complete incident reports, including providing information showing their time-out and time-in. This process is being undertaken by the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office.

Arrest processing time can vary for different offenses. Although the slating or booking of an offender normally takes less than two hours from the moment of arrest, this time can be affected by many variables. For example, an arrest for the possession of a weapon requires that the officer give an interview, prepare a property receipt for the weapon, transport the weapon to the City PD Headquarters, and have the weapon logged into the City PD ballistics section. The officer then has to return to his or her area of assignment, or if appropriate, report off duty. Other types of arrests (homicide, assaults, etc.) can create a different, more complex set of circumstances, which may increase slating time.

The PHA will take the following actions in response to the finding recommendations:

2D-2G: PHA will develop a work plan and implement the recommendations set forth in the Report. In addition, PHAPD will develop a centralized PHAPD records management division that will maintain all incident reports and supplemental records of the PHAPD. Moreover, the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office will undertake regular, random audits of the arrest paperwork turned into the PHAPD records management division.

OIG Evaluation of
PHA's Comments

We recognize there are circumstances when more than three hours of overtime to process an arrest will be required. Our concern was the frequency of extended overtime hours to process arrests and the occasions when multiple officers charged excessive hours for the same arrest.

Recommendations

We recommend the PHA through its PHAPD:

- 2D. Ensure officers are meeting their responsibility for preparing complete incident reports, including information showing the time-out, (when they went off duty to process an arrest), and the time-in, (when the officer came back on duty after completing arrest processing).

-
- 2E. Direct officers through directives or other means, to obtain copies of the City PD slating reports and to submit the slating reports with their incident reports to their supervisors at the close of arrest processing. Instruct supervisors that they should not authorize officer overtime for arrest processing unless the overtime claimed is supported by incident reports and slating reports.
 - 2F. Require PHAPD supervisors to monitor incident reports and slating reports to assure the time spent to process an arrest and the number of PHAPD officers doing the processing is appropriate.
 - 2G. Hold supervisors accountable for implementing the arrest processing overtime controls.
-

CHIEF SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS

The DARs for a few officers contained the overtime category “Chief Complaints”. Eleven percent, or \$14,684, of our overtime sample involved “Chief Complaints”. This overtime category pertained to a special investigations unit that was run solely by the former Chief of the PHAPD. The officers working on the special unit received considerable overtime. For example, the four officers most active in the special investigations unit during 1996 averaged 52, 52, 37 and 33 hours of overtime per week.

Oversight for the Special Investigations Unit

The special investigations unit was accountable only to the Chief. Because of the confidentiality surrounding this special unit, only the Chief was aware of the officers’ assignments and the hours they spent while working the special assignments. Even senior PHAPD officials said they did not know what the officers on the special unit were doing. The oversight and accounting for the officers’ time, including overtime, was handled by the Chief. However, the former Chief did not leave records to explain how the special assignments related to PHA and housing activities or to substantiate the time charged by officers in this unit.

Administrative Procedures Lacking

There was no provision in PHAPD policies and procedures authorizing senior PHAPD officials to administer clandestine cases which were outside the oversight controls governing regular PHAPD cases and operations. Further, in our view, all records relating to any case worked by PHAPD officers should

be maintained as part of normal record keeping unless the PHAPD official can document a compelling reason why the records need to be segregated.

Documentation to Explain
Special Unit Assignments

After considerable searching, PHAPD personnel were able to find documentation to explain the work done by the special unit for approximately 20 percent of the overtime in our “Chief’s Complaints” sample. This documentation indicated the overtime pertained to incidents that were PHA related. The PHAPD could not support the purpose of the remaining 80 percent of overtime paid to the special unit officers.

PHA’s Comments

The issues raised in the OIG report are moot, as the “Chief Complaints” unit has been disbanded. Moreover, all PHAPD overtime requests now must receive pre-approval by the PHA General Manager for Human Resources.

OIG Evaluation of
PHA’s Comments

Because the Chief’s special assignments unit has been disbanded we will close recommendation 2H in our Audits Management System. Further, if the PHAPD will stipulate that all police assignments, including those that pertain to a confidential or restricted subject, will be handled uniformly and subject to the usual oversight controls governing regular PHAPD cases, then we will close recommendation 2I. However, if the PHAPD changes its records management oversight practices when processing cases dealing with confidential or restricted material, then we believe recommendation 2I would still apply.

Recommendations

We recommend the PHA insure that the PHAPD:

- 2H. Requires the Chief to justify all confidential assignments opened by the PHAPD which would cause access to information developed during the assignment to be limited or restricted.

- 2I. Establishes a policy which explains how to handle records produced during a confidential assignment. The policy should address who maintains the records

including the time and attendance records, and how and when those records will be incorporated into the regular PHAPD system of records after completion of the special assignment.

PHAPD PARTICIPATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCES

The PHAPD participated in task force initiatives with State and Federal law enforcement organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the State Bureau of Narcotics Investigation. The stated objective of participating in the task forces was to enable the PHA to obtain greater resources in its efforts to reduce both drugs and weapons in public housing. Eight percent, or \$10,834.39, of our overtime sample dealt with participation in law enforcement task forces. The PHAPD had little documentation to support the time spent by its officers while assigned to these task forces and to explain the relationship some task forces had to PHA operations. Because controls over task force participation were so weak, \$86,000 in reimbursements to which the PHA was entitled from the State of Pennsylvania for overtime that was worked were not sought.

Task Force Maintained Records

Lacking acceptable records at the PHA, we reviewed the records maintained by the various task forces in which the PHAPD participated to confirm the accuracy of the few records that were available at the PHA. We noted some inconsistencies:

- One task force maintained records on a case in which participating officers made a highway stop. The suspect fled and there was no indication that other work was done on this case. Although the officers making the stop were not identified as being PHAPD, we found one housing officer making nine overtime claims for this case.
- PHAPD records showed that its officers received overtime for working with a task force on the same day the task force records showed the officers took the day off. This type of discrepancy occurred four times.
- PHAPD records reported two officers working with a task force the same day that the task force's records showed the officers were working at the PHA.

PHAPD Task Force Records Insufficient

Generally, the PHAPD lacked complete and accurate records on its task force participation. Even case numbers were

incomplete or erroneous and hampered our efforts to gain or verify information. Because PHAPD task force personnel were out stationed, reported attendance only occasionally, and lacked adequate supervision, inaccurate and incomplete record keeping continued unabated. The PHAPD did not seek to obtain from the lead task force agency, copies of daily attendance reports or similar documents to corroborate with the officer attendance.

Because of the incomplete and inaccurate records, the PHAPD could not document that certain task force assignments related to PHA operations, i.e., Camden, New Jersey and Norristown, Pennsylvania. There was no information available to explain how these task force activities were directly related to the safety and security of the PHA's residents. PHAPD supervisors said their former Chief of Police approved these task force details, but they could not explain how the officers operating in these non-PHA locations benefited the PHA's tenants.

Reimbursements for Overtime

In a related matter we noted that the PHAPD participated in a drug elimination task force led by the State of Pennsylvania's Office of Attorney General, Bureau of Narcotics Investigation, from 1991 through 1996. The focus of the joint task force was the elimination of drugs in public housing. The PHAPD's joint agreement with the State provided that the State would reimburse the PHAPD for the overtime worked by approved PHAPD task force members. During 1995 and 1996, the PHAPD received \$109,158 in overtime reimbursements for its task force participation from the Bureau of Narcotics Investigation. However, because of its lack of effective management controls and the absence of record keeping for overtime worked by its officers, it missed out on at least \$86,000 of additional State reimbursements.

Reimbursement Procedures

State reimbursement procedures provided that overtime would only be reimbursed for approved task force members and only for the number of officers required for the operation. The overtime hours had to be pre-approved by State officials, and the PHAPD had to request the reimbursement. The State would not reimburse the overtime hours of officers who were not approved for the task force or pay the overtime for more officers than they requested for an operation.

Unclaimed Overtime Reimbursements

Our sample included 13 PHAPD officers who the State approved for the task force. They made up approximately 10 percent of all the PHAPD personnel assigned to this task force. Also, there were three other PHAPD officers in our sample who charged for task force overtime although they had not been approved for the overtime. Our review of the time sheets for the 13 approved officers, showed that the PHAPD did not seek reimbursement from the State for at least \$86,000 in overtime to which it was entitled. The \$86,000 in unclaimed overtime would have come from State resources and could have been used to further tenant safety and security.

PHA's Comments

The PHAPD is only participating in one task force at present (with the DEA). Since it is conceivable that there will be other State and Federal task forces in the future, such task forces will be entered into with a clear understanding of project objectives and purpose, similar to the DEA task force agreement.

The present administration has implemented a policy to reduce the administrative problems associated with PHAPD participation in State and Federal task forces. Specifically, the State or Federal agency to which a PHAPD officer is assigned reviews and signs the PHAPD officer's DAR. This control will allow PHA to recover reimbursement costs from State and Federal agencies so that PHA operating funds can be used to provide residents with core services.

Since the present PHA administration has implemented a policy providing that PHAPD overtime will not be issued unless approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources, the overtime payments associated with PHAPD participation in task forces in past administrations will be significantly reduced.

The PHA reported it has taken or will take the following actions in response to the finding recommendations:

2J-2N: The PHA will consider and investigate the feasibility of implementing the OIG Report Recommendations. In addition, PHA has already implemented a system for ensuring reimbursement from State and Federal agencies for PHAPD participation in task force assignments. The policy provides for the participating agency to review and sign off on the PHAPD

officer's signed DAR. Moreover, all PHAPD overtime requests associated with State or Federal task forces are required to receive pre-approval by the PHA General Manager for Human Resources.

OIG Evaluation of
PHA's Comments

We recognize the PHA's progress in correcting control deficiencies related to its task force participation and look forward to its implementation of the related recommendations.

Recommendations

We recommend the PHA:

- 2J. Establish management controls to guide its participation in the task forces. The controls should address the procedures the PHAPD will use to assign PHAPD officers to the task force, account for each officer's time on the task force, and periodically reconcile PHAPD and task force time records.
- 2K. Advise its task force partners that PHAPD officers can only participate in cases and operations that directly relate to PHA locations and activities.
- 2L. Ensure that the PHAPD case file fully explains the nexus that any task force operation has if it is going to take place away from PHA locations. All conditions pertaining to the PHAPD's participation in the task force should be stipulated in a Memorandum of Understanding executed with the other law enforcement organization.
- 2M. Ensure that task force cooperative agreements include a requirement that the lead agency maintain records showing the assignments and hours charged by PHAPD personnel. Request the task force lead agency to furnish the PHAPD with the assignment and time reports for PHAPD officers who are on detail to the task force.
- 2N. Establish a procedure whereby, before approving the time charges of the task force officer, the responsible

PHAPD supervisor must corroborate the time claimed by the officer in the PHAPD DAR to the independent time records supplied by the task force lead agency. Assure the supervisor reconciles any differences and follows up and holds officers accountable for correcting discrepancies.

PAYMENTS FOR UNIDENTIFIED OVERTIME CHARGES

Apart from the documentation problems we found for the overtime that was categorized by purpose, the purpose of 22 percent of the overtime, which amounted to \$30,321 (the largest part of our sample), was not documented by the PHAPD. This occurred because PHAPD supervisors did not have to identify the purpose of overtime on the DAR. In fact, there were no instructions on what and how to enter any of the elements on the DAR.

Overtime Purpose was Documented

Even without a PHAPD policy, most supervisors documented the purpose of overtime. We found some supervisors listing the purpose of officer overtime on the DAR, daily roster lists, and overtime logs. However, PHAPD supervisors were not consistent in how and where they identified the purpose of officer overtime. Lacking information about the purpose of overtime, there is no assurance that the overtime use was appropriate and the amount of overtime claimed by the officer was reasonable.

PHA's Comments

The PHA has tasked the present PHAPD management with reviewing this practice and implementing a uniform system for recording overtime.

The PHA reported it will take the following actions in response to the finding recommendations:

2P: The PHAPD will develop and implement a policy explaining the purpose of the DAR, the information to be entered on the DAR, and how the DAR is to be used by PHAPD supervisors. This policy will include administrative requirements for entering the amount and purpose of officer overtime, as well as instructions for preparing related documents that support overtime charges, such as the daily roster lists and overtime logs.

OIG Evaluation of
PHA's Comments

The PHA's implementation of the proposed policy will satisfy the recommendation 2P.

Recommendation

2P. We recommend the PHA develop and implement a policy explaining the purpose of the DAR, the information to be entered on the DAR, and how the DAR is to be used by PHAPD supervisors. This policy should include the administrative requirements for entering on the DAR the amount and purpose of officer overtime. Also, include instructions for preparing related documents that support overtime charges, such as the daily roster lists and overtime logs, to assure the forms are prepared and used consistently between supervisors.

SUPERVISORY COMPENSATORY TIME

According to the PHA's personnel policy, PHAPD supervisors are entitled to compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay for extra hours worked. Our sample included 237 hours of compensatory time claimed by supervisory staff.

Most Compensatory Time
Not Supported

Similar to our review of PHAPD officer overtime, we requested the PHAPD to provide information for our sample to explain the purpose of the compensatory time and to support the amount of compensatory time awarded to supervisory personnel. For our sample, the PHAPD could not support the validity of 97 percent of the compensatory time claimed on the supervisors' DARs. Further, any oversight would have been ineffective since the PHAPD did not have records which could have corroborated the compensatory time claimed by supervisors.

Excessive Compensatory
Time

In addition, supervisors claimed more compensatory time than they earned. The PHAPD's personnel policy stated that supervisors would receive one hour of compensatory time for each hour that was worked beyond his/her normal work day. We found occasions on which some supervisors received excessive compensatory time by claiming one and a half hours, double time, and even as much as four hours of compensatory

time for each hour beyond the normal work day. A lack of managerial oversight precluded the excessive claims for compensatory time from being detected.

PHA's Comments

Although the issues raised in the report were due to lack of oversight of PHAPD supervisory personnel in the prior administration, this has been remedied by requiring pre-approval by the Executive Director for all compensatory time. In addition, the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office has assigned a detective to oversee PHAPD supervisory compensatory time to ensure that adequate records are maintained and returned, and that the requirement of one hour of compensatory time per hour of overtime work is followed.

The PHA reported it will take the following actions in response to the finding recommendations:

2Q: PHA will advise all PHAPD supervisors that they are entitled to receive only one hour of compensatory time for each hour worked beyond the normal workday, with the exception of holidays, which are credited at double compensatory time.

2R: PHA is also establishing a control, through the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office, so that supervisor compensatory time is subject to regular audits. In addition, since 1998 the PHAPD has required pre-approval for all compensatory time and justification for each hour worked for overtime or compensatory time.

OIG Evaluation of
PHA's Comments

The actions proposed by the PHA will satisfy recommendations 2Q and 2R. However, the recommendations will remain open until PHA provides documentation of the notice to PHAPD supervisors clarifying earned compensatory time and evidence of the oversight control for compensatory time.

Recommendations

We recommend that the PHA:

- 2Q. Ensure that all PHAPD supervisors are aware that they receive one hour of compensatory time for each hour worked beyond the normal work day.

 - 2R. Establish a PHAPD control whereby superior rank supervisors review the compensatory time claimed by subordinates to ensure the time is necessary, reasonable and fully supported. Recapture, where appropriate, the excessive compensatory hours credited to the supervisors cited in the report.
-

PROVIDING SECURITY FOR SENIOR PHA OFFICIALS

Two PHAPD officers were detailed to provide security and other services to the former Executive Director. However, the PHA's use of security during our audit period appeared excessive. PHAPD security for the former Executive Director extended beyond the normal work day and involved locations that did not appear related to PHA activities. Expending PHAPD resources to pay officers overtime for services unrelated to the PHA's business was wasteful and reduced the PHAPD resources available for tenant security.

Executive Director Security

The same two officers claimed overtime hours for providing personal security to the former Executive Director at locations that included his personal residence, social establishments and other non-PHA locations. Frequently, the personal security at these locations went into the early morning hours. There was no documentation to explain or justify why security was needed at the non-PHA locations that went beyond normal business hours.

Security Detail Overtime

The security detail contributed greatly to the overtime paid to these officers. There were many weeks when the security officers claimed and were paid more than 60 hours of overtime. There was one week when they earned in excess of 70 hours of overtime.

Officer Selection for Security Detail

No one currently employed at the PHAPD could or would explain why these officers were assigned to the former Executive Director. They said the special detail was approved by the former PHAPD Chief of Police and the special detail officers only reported to the Chief. A high ranking PHAPD official said he knew the officers were "shadowing" the former Executive Director, but he did not think it was often.

<p>PHAPD Needs Policy Governing Security Details</p>	<p>The current Executive Director has one officer assigned to him for security. However, the PHAPD still lacks an overall security policy addressing issues such as: What PHA officials need security? Under what circumstance is security necessary? What is the appropriate level of security?</p>
<p>PHA's Comments</p>	<p>The nature of the Executive Director's position, and that of other Executive Staff members, may from time to time require security from PHAPD officers. It is anticipated that such occasions will be rare. When such a situation does arise, it will be handled on a case-by-case basis, depending upon the level of danger and immediacy of the threat. The final determination regarding PHAPD officer protection will be made by the PHA Executive Director and the PHAPD Chief.</p> <p>The PHA reported it has taken the following action in response to the finding recommendation:</p> <p>2S: A memorandum has been issued setting forth the policy for executive staff security. Consequently, no PHAPD officers will be assigned to PHA executive staff members absent valid safety concerns and approval.</p>
<p>OIG Evaluation of PHA's Comments</p>	<p>The PHA policy addressing executive staff security satisfies recommendation 2S. We will record final action completed and close recommendation 2S in our Audits Management System.</p>
<p>Recommendation</p>	<p>We recommend the PHA:</p> <p>2S. Establish a policy regarding the provision of security services for PHA employees and officials.</p>

C. PAYROLL COMPUTATIONS

The PHAPD needs to take effective measures to assure payroll computations are accurate. Payroll administration and accounting is essentially a manual process which lacks written policies and

procedures. Manually calculating the weekly payroll caused frequent errors, both over- and underpayments, in the compensation paid to PHAPD officers.

PHAPD Needs Policies for Preparing Payroll

The PHAPD clerks responsible for calculating payroll did not have written policies and procedures for preparing payroll, although the clerks did maintain their own notes on the various payroll provisions of the PHAPD Union Contracts. However, the individuality of the guides caused inconsistencies between clerks in their payroll computations and contributed to over- and underpayments to PHAPD personnel.

Majority of Weekly Payrolls Had Miscalculations

We tested 258 weekly payroll calculations for 22 PHAPD employees and found 136 (53 percent) were miscalculated. The errors caused both over- and underpayments. Individual employee miscalculations caused overpayments as high as \$700 and underpayments as high as \$351. The net effect of the errors was \$1,102 in overpayments.

Reasons for Payroll Miscalculations

The most common types of errors involved overtime coding because clerks inconsistently applied overtime rates and miscalculated shift differential hours. Further, the DAR was the clerk's source document for computing an officer's payroll. The DARs were prepared by the officers' supervisors. However, the DARs we reviewed contained recurrent errors that included authorizing payment for overlapping hours (whereby an officer is paid for the same work hours twice) and common math mistakes. Generally, the payroll clerks did not catch the errors in the DAR since PHAPD controls did not require clerks to verify the accuracy of DARs. Payroll clerks would take the total hours the supervisor approved on the DAR as the basis for computing an officer's payroll.

The absence of automated payroll computations hindered further the payroll calculation process. Since payroll was not automated, the payroll clerks had to prepare the weekly payroll manually. This was a very time consuming and error prone process.

PHA's Comments

The PHA is in the process of investigating the upgrade of its computer system, whereby the DARs will be processed by computer, which in turn will allow payroll calculations and

coding to be performed electronically, minimizing errors. It is believed that this change will significantly decrease future calculation errors. In addition, PHA requests from the OIG a list of all PHAPD personnel who were either overpaid or underpaid as a result of possible calculation errors. Upon review and investigation of this information, PHA would seek restitution of overpayments and would pay those employees who were underpaid.

The PHA reported it will take the following actions in response to the finding recommendations:

2T-2W: PHA agrees to investigate and implement, if appropriate, the recommendations set forth in the OIG report. The PHA is in the process of investigating the upgrade of its computer system, whereby the DARs will be processed by computer, which in turn will allow payroll calculations and coding to be performed electronically.

OIG Evaluation of PHA's Comments

The OIG will provide the PHA a list of the PHAPD employees it found to have been either overpaid or underpaid as a result of possible calculation errors.

Recommendations

We recommend that you direct the PHA to:

- 2T. Develop and implement official PHAPD payroll policies and procedures and assure they comply with the provisions of applicable union contracts.
- 2U. Ensure that the procedures include a control whereby the payroll clerk will review the DAR for inconsistencies and overlapping hours and verify mathematical accuracy.
- 2V. Develop an automated payroll process that will allow payroll clerks to enter DAR data to the system.


Finding 2

- 2W. Recover the overpayments which have been made from the affected employees and pay the amounts which are due to the employees who received underpayments.
-

Some DEG Funding Was Not Used As Intended

Some Drug Elimination Program funding was not used to hire the additional police officers that were requested in the PHA’s application. Also, some vehicles purchased for the PHAPD were not used for their intended purpose.

Since 1993, the PHA has applied for and been awarded Drug Elimination Grant (DEG) funds. The PHA’s allocation of DEG funds to the PHAPD has been relatively consistent during our audit period.




We reviewed two purposes to which the PHAPD applied its DEG funds: hiring additional officers and purchasing police vehicles.

HIRING ADDITIONAL POLICE OFFICERS

In 1995, the PHA requested DEG funds to hire 20 additional officers. The PHA requested funding to hire 16 officers in 1996 and in 1997 funding to hire 20 officers. The PHA’s justification was that its PHAPD needed additional officers to address the level of crime in its housing developments.

DEG Funds Did Not Produce Expected Officer Increase

Although the PHA used the DEG funding allocated for new officers, there was no corresponding change in the actual number of PHAPD officers. Our review of the PHAPD personnel charged to the DEG fund account disclosed that some of these individuals had been PHAPD employees years prior to the DEG funds being awarded to the PHA.



DEG Funds Should Raise Security Levels

DEG funds should be used to supplement the resources the PHA used to address crime in its public housing locations and not to replace an existing level of police security. After the introduction of the DEG funded officers, the PHA tenants and HUD should have expected an increased level of security at the PHA developments. What HUD and the tenants appeared to get, was a continuation of the existing level of PHAPD officer security which even declined in one of the DEG funded years.

PHA's Comments

Under the Fiscal Year (FY) 1993 Drug Elimination Grant (DEG), the PHA hired 20 new officers, all of whom graduated from the City of Philadelphia Police Academy. This grant was for a two-year period. The continuation of the employment of these 20 new officers was again funded in 1995 and 1997. The PHA believes that the language in the grants allowed use of grant funds to continue the officers' employment.

Under the FY 1996 DEG, the PHA hired 16 officers, all of whom graduated from the City of Philadelphia Police Academy. This grant was also for a two-year period, and in FY 1998 PHA received authorization to continue to employ these 16 officers. In addition, all 36 of the officers PHA hired through the DEG program performed drug elimination work, as the grant required.

The number of funded positions in the chart titled “Actual and Funded PHA Officers” is mis-stated. The number of funded officers was as follows:

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Operating</u>	<u>Section 8</u>	<u>Comp Grant 164</u>	<u>Comp Grant 169</u>	<u>DEG</u>
1995	243	150	1	46	26	20
1996	242	150	0	46	26	20
1997	258	150	0	46	26	36

Therefore, the actual “variance” between the number of funded officers and the number of actual officers is as shown in the table below:

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Total Funded</u>	<u>Total Actual</u>	<u>Variance</u>
1995	243	249	(5)
1996	242	237	5
1997	258	245	13

The variance between the funded and actual number of officers was caused by two forces beyond the control of PHA. First, PHA has had tremendous difficulty recruiting and retaining qualified officers. Police departments in some of the counties surrounding Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia Police Department provide higher compensation to their officers. PHA officers, therefore, often seek employment with those departments after PHA has funded their training at the City of Philadelphia Police Academy.

PHA also maintained vacancies in its operating budget area because of shortfalls in funding by HUD. In Fiscal Years 1995, 1996, and 1997, PHA had funding shortfalls of 5%, 4% and 11%, respectively. To make up these shortfalls, the prior administration maintained vacancies in the PHAPD and in other areas.

Despite the recruiting and funding difficulties, PHA employed officers in the drug elimination area up to the limits of the DEG funding. If an opening arose in the DEG area, PHA would often transfer an officer from its operating budget area to the drug elimination area because PHA viewed drug elimination as one of its highest priorities. Once an officer was transferred from the operating area to the drug elimination area on PHA

financial records, that officer's duties would also change to drug elimination work. PHA, therefore, believes that all DEG funding was properly used for drug elimination work, as intended by the grants.

The DEG funds were used to augment, and not to supplant the existing PHA police force. The existing force continued to perform its duties as outlined in the MOU with the City, while the DEG funded officers supplemented that existing force by concentrating exclusively on drug elimination work. It is, therefore, PHA's belief that it used the DEG funds as intended in the grant. While it is true that the actual number of non-DEG funded officers decreased slightly, the reasons for that decrease were outside of PHA's control.

The PHA reported the following actions regarding the finding recommendations:

3A - 3C: The PHA did hire 20 additional officers (names provided) as funded under the FY 1993 DEG, and continued under the 1995 and 1997 DEG grants. Under the FY 1996 DEG, the PHA hired 16 officers (names provided), and continued this employment through the 1998 grant.

OIG Evaluation of
PHA's Comments

By applying for DEG funds, the PHA agreed to the terms and conditions of the DEG Program. Eligible activities, according to 24 CFR 761.15 (b), included "Additional HA police services to be funded under this program must be over and above those that the existing HA police, if any provides...".

In accepting the DEG funds for hiring additional police, the PHA became obligated to maintaining its existing level of police. The PHA should not have drawn down its DEG funds approved for additional officers if it could not maintain its existing police level.

The PHA commented about its difficulty in hiring and keeping qualified officers. The PHA also noted that it maintained vacancies in its operating budget area because of shortfalls in funding by HUD. To make up for the shortfalls, the prior administration maintained vacancies in the PHAPD and in other areas.

We understand that the current job market has increased competition amongst potential employers seeking qualified applicants. We also recognize that reduced funding can cause the PHA to make difficult decisions regarding the level of funding it would provide to its various operations including the PHAPD. However, despite these obstacles, to qualify for the DEG funding for additional officers, it was incumbent on the PHA to, first and foremost, maintain its existing level of police services. This accomplished, the PHA would be in a position to draw down the DEG funds to hire additional officers.

As we found and as the PHA explained in its response, the PHA drew down DEG funds to hire officers ostensibly charged to the DEG program, when the level of officers funded from other PHA sources was declining. In fact, the PHA noted in its comments that the 1999 level of PHAPD officers has fallen to 182. This shows that the number of officers serving the PHA's tenants has continued to decline.

The PHA's response provided us with lists of PHAPD officers hired in fiscal years 1993 and 1996. The PHA maintained that the lists included the officers hired with DEG funds. The PHA, through its response, did not demonstrate that the DEG funded officers supplemented existing PHAPD officer levels. The PHA explained that it could not maintain its base officer level because of the effect the job market and reduced HUD funding had on hiring. We found this comment and accompanying information sufficient to answer our recommendation 3A. Therefore, we have entered final action completed and closed recommendation 3A in our Audits Management System. Also, we modified recommendations 3B and 3C in the final report to reflect that PHA could not demonstrate its DEG funds supplemented existing officer levels.

Recommendations

We recommend that the PHA:

- 3A. Provide a list of the additional PHAPD officers hired with DEG funds and demonstrate how the DEG funded officers supplemented existing PHAPD officer levels.

If the PHA makes future requests of DEG funds for hiring additional officers, we recommend that HUD direct the PHA to submit:

3B. Information establishing pre-DEG PHAPD officer levels;

and on an interim basis stipulated by HUD,

3C. Information evidencing the supplemental officers hired under the DEG Program.

DEG FUNDED EQUIPMENT PURCHASES

The PHA was authorized \$190,000 in 1995 DEG funds to purchase vehicles for its PHAPD patrols and operations. The PHA purchased 10 vehicles with its DEG funds. However, the former PHA administration chose not to use all the DEG funded vehicles for police business.

DEG Vehicles Not Used for Police Business

Though we did not determine conclusively how it happened, two of the vehicles purchased with DEG funds were assigned to the PHA Executive Office from the day they were acquired. Later, the PHA Executive Office added a third DEG purchased vehicle. The three vehicles remained at the disposal of the Executive Office when we completed our field work.

Anticipated Vehicle Return

The PHAPD Deputy Chief for Administration said the current administration was unaware it had three DEG funded vehicles in its fleet that belonged with the PHAPD. We informed the PHA administration about this condition and they agreed to return the three vehicles to the PHAPD.

PHA's Comments

In prior PHA administrations, PHA executives used PHAPD vehicles purchased with DEG funds. The present administration had implemented a policy providing that no PHAPD vehicles purchased with DEG funds are used by executive staff. PHA will permit the use of these vehicles only by PHAPD personnel.

The PHA reported it has taken or will take the following actions in response to the finding recommendations:

3D: Attached is a certification by the current Executive Director of the PHA and the Chief of Police for the PHA, stating that the three DEG funded vehicles have been returned to the PHAPD.

3E: PHA has assigned an employee to develop and implement a written procedure that ensures that DEG funded vehicles are utilized by Police personnel only, and tracked accordingly.

OIG Evaluation of PHA's Comments

The certifications by the PHA Executive Director and the PHAPD Chief of Police that the DEG funded vehicles have been returned to the PHAPD are satisfactory to address our recommendation 3D. Therefore, we are entering final action completed and closing recommendation 3D in our Audits Management System. Recommendation 3E will remain open until we receive a copy of the authorized PHA procedure that will ensure DEG funded vehicles are utilized by Police personnel only and tracked accordingly.

Recommendations

We recommend that you direct the PHA to:

- 3D. Obtain and submit to HUD a certification by its Chief of Police that the Executive Office has returned the three DEG funded vehicles to the PHAPD.
- 3E. Establish a control for its fleet management operations that recognizes restrictions in vehicles' usage as imposed by programs like DEG whereby vehicles purchased under the program must be used for that program's activities and not be used for or assigned to any other PHA operation.

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Management Controls

Management controls consist of a plan of organization and methods and procedures adopted by management to ensure that resource use is consistent with laws, regulations, and policies. Management controls include the processes for planning, organizing, directing, and controlling program operations. They contain the control environment for risk assessment, information systems, control procedures, communication, and measuring and monitoring program performance.

Relevant Management Controls

In planning this performance audit, we evaluated the PHA management controls related to our objectives to determine our audit scope and the procedures we would use to do the audit. Relevant to our audit objectives were the PHA management systems and controls for:

- Establishing quantifiable and measurable levels of baseline City PD services to PHA developments and monitoring if the City PD is providing the baseline police services;
- Ensuring equitable distributions of overtime and compensatory time between PHAPD officers, detectives and supervisors;
- Restricting officers' consecutive hours worked to a safe level and requiring officers to take mandatory rest periods;
- Approving, accounting, supporting and overseeing officer overtime and compensatory time;
- Calculating PHAPD payroll accurately and according to the applicable union contracts;
- Ensuring that DEG funds are used in the amounts and for the purposes described in the HUD approved DEG application;
- Managing PHAPD participation in task forces with other law enforcement organizations.

A significant weakness exists if management controls do not give reasonable assurance that: resource use is consistent with laws, regulations, and policies; resources are safeguarded

Significant Weaknesses

against waste, loss, and misuse; and reliable data are obtained, maintained, and fairly disclosed in reports.

From our review, we determined the following to be significant weaknesses.

- The PHA has not established quantifiable and measurable levels of baseline police services the City PD will provide to PHA developments and, therefore, lacks the means to monitor if it is getting the required baseline services.
- The payment of overtime wages to offices which exceeded their relative share without justification.
- The lack of an effective system for approving, accounting, supporting and authorizing PHAPD overtime and compensatory time.
- The lack of a system that would ensure accurate PHAPD payroll calculations and that the payroll was calculated according to the union contracts.
- The lack of PHA systems to ensure that DEG funds met program requirements to the extent described in the applications or that the PHA used the DEG funds for only DEG related activities.
- The lack of guidelines governing the PHAPD's participation in task forces with other law enforcement agencies.
- The lack of controls to ensure the reasonableness of overtime worked.

These PHA management control weaknesses increased audit risk and caused us to amend our original audit methodologies and increase our audit scope.

Follow Up On Prior Audits

This is the Office of Inspector General's initial audit involving the PHA's Police Department. Over the years the Office of Inspector General has conducted numerous audits which covered a substantial portion of the PHA's operations. Further, we considered follow up work in connection with these assignments to be beyond the scope of this review.

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“PHA’s Response” to Sections of Report

PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY

12 South 23RD Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103-4497
215-684-4000



Carl R. Greene
Executive Director

October 27, 1999

Mr. David Niemeic, Office of Inspector General
U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development
The Wanamaker Building, 10th Floor
100 Penn Square East
Philadelphia, PA 19107-0500

Dear Mr. Niemeic:

Attached is our detailed response to the Office of Inspector General’s review of the Philadelphia Housing Authority’s (PHA) Police Department.

Please note that the response references a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the City and PHA, which we are in the process of developing jointly. It is anticipated that the MOU will be finalized in the next sixty (60) days, at which time we will forward a copy to your office.

Thank you for your continued cooperation throughout this process. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or Michael Leithead, Executive Deputy Director, at 215-684-4025.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'CRG', written over a light blue horizontal line.

Carl R. Greene
Executive Director

CRG/ed

cc: Michael J. Leithead, Executive Deputy Director

PHA 24474

**PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY RESPONSE TO
AUDIT REPORT OF OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

TO: David J. Niemiec, Acting District Inspector General for Audit, Mid-Atlantic
FROM: Carl Greene, Executive Director, Philadelphia Housing Authority
SUBJECT: Response to Review of the Philadelphia Housing Authority's Police Department

Introduction (PHA Response)

In response to the Office of Inspector General's (the "OIG") Audit Report of the Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department (the "OIG Report"), the Philadelphia Housing Authority (the "PHA") reviewed numerous procedures and policies that have been implemented under current PHA management, which began in March 1998 with the appointment of Carl Greene as Executive Director of the PHA. The PHA also met with its staff members and examined some of those records that the OIG examined. The PHA review and preparation of this response was conducted over a three-week time period.

Mr. Greene is the former Executive Director of the Detroit, Michigan Housing Commission ("DHC"). As Executive Director of DHC, Mr. Greene was responsible for providing leadership and implementing systemic policy changes that directly improved the services provided to DHC residents, as well as their quality of life, including improving the DHC's Public Housing Management Assessment Program ("PHMAP") status with the U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development by increasing its PHMAP scores from 37.60 to 82.98 over a three year period.

When Mr. Greene was hired as PHA Executive Director, he recognized systemic problems in the PHA, including a history of mismanagement of the PHA Police Department ("PHAPD"). Reforming and restructuring the PHAPD was, and remains, a top priority in the Greene administration. Mr. Greene recognized the limitations of PHA's operating budget, which could not effectively support a full-scale police force and at the same time provide PHA residents with core services. Accordingly, Mr. Greene's administration has begun to focus on the provision of core services, such as maintenance at PHA facilities, while restructuring the

PHAPD, which will now focus on providing “targeted” police services, such as drug elimination programs, to supplement police services that the City of Philadelphia Police Department (the “City PD”) provides to PHA residents.

In furtherance of Mr. Greene’s policy for refocusing the activities of the PHAPD, Richard Zappile was hired as PHAPD Chief on June 11, 1999 to help implement a number of reforms. Chief Zappile spent 30 years in the City PD, achieving the rank of Deputy Commissioner for Operations, the second ranking position in the City PD. During his tenure with the City PD, Chief Zappile was responsible for a number of reforms, including decentralizing all detective functions to the field commander level, reorganizing the City PD Human Relations Department and introducing quality management principles, and curbing overtime abuses in the City PD Homicide Department. After leaving the City PD, Chief Zappile was appointed Deputy Mayor of Philadelphia by Mayor Rendell, with responsibility for Criminal Justice Programs. At Mr. Greene’s direction, PHAPD Chief Zappile has drafted and initiated an operational plan to overhaul the PHAPD and institute those reformation policies and programs envisioned by Mr. Greene. *See Exhibit A.*

In addition, in August 1999, the PHAPD hired Nancy Hartsough to head the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office, which has oversight of some of the issues raised in the OIG Report, including overtime usage and developing records management and retention systems. Ms. Hartsough, a former Philadelphia Assistant District Attorney, will work with a staff of 17 individuals, consisting of 13 detectives, some of whom are assigned specific managerial oversight and auditing responsibility, one lieutenant, one sergeant, and an administrative aide/paralegal.

Summary (PHA Response)

The PHAPD and City PD have opened discussions concerning their respective responsibilities for providing PHA residents with police services, including the provision of "baseline services" by the City PD. Through open communication and ongoing dialogue between the two police departments, and stronger leadership at the PHA executive level, a clear delineation of duties and responsibilities between the PHAPD and City PD is being established and will be maintained.

PHA Executive Director Greene, with the assistance of the PHAPD Chief and the Integrity and Accountability Office, has also substantially strengthened controls of those aspects of the PHAPD addressed in the OIG Report, including the establishment of policies and procedures governing the payment of overtime and the establishment of records management and retention policies. In addition, the PHA Office of Inspector General ("PHA OIG") has scheduled audits of the PHAPD in its Audit Plan for 2001 to ensure that the steps taken to curb past overtime abuses are in place, functioning and effective.

Prior to receiving the OIG Report, the PHA and PHAPD had already implemented a number of policies and procedures that address and remedy many of the issues raised in the OIG Report. In addition, the PHA and PHAPD have taken steps to implement other recommendations set forth in the OIG Report, including investigating the implementation of an automated payroll system.

Finding 1 (PHA Response): PHAPD Resources Used to Provide Baseline Police Services at PHA Developments

The PHAPD was established in 1979 to supplement baseline services provided by the City PD to residents of the PHA. At the time of the audited years (1995-1997), there was no accurate degree of measurement on what baseline services the City PD was to provide to PHA residents, what services were actually being provided to PHA residents, or what calls for service the City PD were responding to in PHA facilities. On taking office in March 1998, Mr. Greene identified these deficiencies and charted a course of action to remedy the problems.

The PHAPD has initiated communications with City PD officials, including City PD Commissioner Timoney to, among other things, establish a quantifiable definition of the "baseline services" the City PD is to provide PHA residents, as well as a framework to maintain and monitor these services.² See Exhibit B. Without first establishing a definition of "baseline services," it is impossible to determine whether, and to what extent, the City PD is providing such services.

The PHA has also submitted to the City PD a draft updated Memorandum of Understanding for Coordination of Law Enforcement Responsibilities (the "updated MOU"). The updated MOU includes, among others, the following delineation of services:

- a. The City PD shall be responsible for all 911 assignments in PHA scattered sites;

² Gordon Wasserman, City PD Commissioner Timoney's Chief of Staff, has been assigned as the primary liaison between the PHAPD and the City PD. Mr. Wasserman and the PHAPD Chief have been meeting approximately once a week to discuss issues that effect both the City PD and PHAPD.

b. In areas of concurrent jurisdiction, the City PD shall assume primary responsibility for investigations and the PHAPD shall assist;

c. The PHAPD and City PD shall assign members of their command staffs as liaison officers to coordinate efforts of the respective departments to concerning the provision of services to PHA residents; and

d. The PHAPD and City PD shall share weekly crime statistic information.

Mr. Greene further addressed the issue of City PD services by commissioning, in August 1998, TAG Associates to prepare a report (the "TAG Report"), which, in part, addressed the City PD's involvement at PHA facilities. Based in part upon the TAG Report findings, Mr. Greene implemented a number of the programs and policies discussed in this response. In addition, Mr. Greene hired an experienced law enforcement officer, Richard Zappile, to help develop, refine and implement these programs and policies.

Among other things, under Chief Zappile the PHAPD is implementing site-based policing, especially at sites where quality of life issues have deteriorated and there is a need for community based policing. See Exhibit C hereto. This program will supplement, as opposed to supplant, baseline services that the City PD is providing to PHA residents.

Moreover, upon taking control of the PHA, Mr. Greene determined that the PHA operating budget could not support both core services, such as maintenance of PHA facilities, and public safety services, such as a full-service police department like the PHAPD. Consequently, the PHAPD is shifting focus from a "full-service" police department to a "targeted" department that would provide supplemental services to the City PD, including site-based policing, along with other anti-crime and drug elimination programs. The initiation of these and other programs will assist in lowering the crime rate at PHA facilities and improving the quality of life for PHA residents without detracting from core services.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

1A. A draft updated MOU has been submitted to the City that will establish a quantifiable and measurable level of baseline police services the City PD will provide to PHA residents. This updated MOU will be entered into between the PHA and the City of Philadelphia and will supercede the MOU from the previous administration.

1B. Effective January, 2000, the City PD will be able to provide the PHAPD electronically with the calls for service and founded Part I (indictable offenses) and Part II (misdemeanors) crimes and/or arrests on PHA properties.

1C. Based on the information received from the City PD, the PHAPD will be able to deploy site-based policing, along with specialized units (ACT teams, PHAPD Drug Task Forces, etc.) to curtail any quantitative problems identified from the information received from the City PD. This will supplement City PD services in PHA facilities.

In addition, the PHAPD has made arrangements with the City PD to allow PHAPD police officers and City PD police officers to communicate via radio while on duty. The long-range goal is to eliminate the PHAPD radio functions and have all radio functions operated by the City PD

At this point, it is premature to consider legal remedies to enforce the City's responsibility to provide "baseline services" to PHA residents, as there is no measurable definition of "baseline services" that the City may or may not be providing. New PHA leadership is in the process of developing the "baseline services" definition with the City. Unless and until such a definition is established, and the PHA can monitor the City PD's provision of such services, it is counterproductive to consider litigation as an option to addressing this issue

Finding 2 (PHA Response): Better Controls Should be Exercised over PHAPD Overtime

Mr. Greene inherited a PHAPD with a history of mismanagement. Aside from hiring a new PHAPD Chief, Mr. Greene has put in place a system of separation of duties, effective monitoring and oversight, and institutionalized oversight to remedy the historic problems with the PHAPD. Mr. Greene and his staff implemented these measures to ensure a system of checks and balances, so that no one individual or department is free from accountability or scrutiny.

For example, as noted in the OIG Report, the present PHA administration has taken action to reduce significantly the amount of overtime worked by the PHAPD. Specifically, overtime will no longer be allowed unless personally approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources. *See Exhibit D hereto.* This protocol has already reduced, and will continue to reduce, overtime to those instances for which it is required and necessary. Moreover, a detective from the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office has been assigned to review overtime payments on a weekly basis. Finally, the PHA OIG will conduct audits of PHAPD overtime to ensure compliance with preexisting policies and that the measures adopted are, in fact, working effectively.

A. PHAPD Distribution of Overtime (PHA Response)

As noted in the OIG Report, the present PHA administration reduced 1998 PHAPD overtime payments to below 1995 levels, and approximately \$1.5 million below the 1997 level. The dramatic decrease in overtime payments to PHAPD officers is a direct result of new policies and stronger leadership in the PHA, including the policy that PHAPD overtime will not be issued unless personally approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources.

During the period audited (1995-1997, which was prior to the present administration) there was an abundance of mandatory and/or promised PHAPD coverage at sites designated by the PHAPD Chief and/or Executive Office. In the event of any absenteeism or shortage of manpower, overtime was authorized by the line supervisor, in many cases a sergeant, to fill the vacancy. There was no policy for the allocation of this cost and it was left to the discretion of a line supervisor without PHAPD Command Level approval or review. The practice of mandatory and/or promised coverage has been eliminated, thus there are no longer any projected overtime assignments as there had been in past administrations.

Also, during the time period examined in the OIG Report PHAPD maintained a Chief's Squad comprised of four (4) police officers who worked exclusively for the PHAPD Chief in handling complaints and other assignments. These four (4) employees were part of the OIG Report sampling, and the overtime dollars that unit amassed were covered in the pie chart for "Chief Complaint" (along with a portion of the arrest and court overtime cost associated thereto). Members of the PHAPD staff, with the exception of the Deputy Chief and Assistant to the Chief, were not privy to the assignments handled by this select group. The Chief's Squad has been eliminated by the present PHA administration.

Overtime costs are now predominately attributed to arrests that extend beyond the normal working hours of employees, court appearance and other exigent circumstances that typically arise in law enforcement assignments. Consequently, overtime payments, while never certain in a given time period, will now be able to be predicted with greater certainty and can be budgeted accordingly. Moreover, the present administration has taken action against a PHAPD employee who was falsifying Daily Attendance Reports ("DAR") to obtain overtime payments, as well as a supervisor who approved the DARs. The investigation, conducted by PHA OIG, resulted in the termination of the employee. The supervisor is no longer with PHA.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

2A. PHA has implemented a policy providing that PHAPD overtime will not be issued unless personally approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources. *See* Exhibit D. The OIG Report recognizes that this policy, in part, has led to the reduction of overtime by approximately \$1.5 million from 1997 to 1998.

Due to the nature of law enforcement work generally, it is difficult to formulate a policy concerning the equitable distribution of overtime. However, PHA will be tracking overtime and compensatory time to spot trends in distribution, and will review its policies on an ongoing basis.

Another layer of oversight will be provided by the PHA OIG, which will schedule a follow-up audit in its Audit Plan for fiscal year 2001 to evaluate the corrective actions taken by the PHAPD on overtime. The PHA OIG audit will include tests of the DARs and other records as is

necessary to justify and document PHAPD overtime charges to ensure that the corrective measures taken are effective.

The PHA agrees with the OIG Report recommendation to implement a policy requiring mandatory rest periods for officers and limits the number of consecutive hours that PHAPD officers can work.

B. Oversight and Accountability for PHAPD Overtime (PHA Response)

Although the issues raised in the OIG Report concerning PHAPD record keeping occurred prior to the present PHA administration, on taking office Mr. Greene recognized that this was a problem that needed to be addressed. Accordingly, the present PHA administration has hired a PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Officer who has been tasked to develop, among other policies, a records management and retention policy. The new PHAPD policy requires that all records be maintained for a period of five (5) years, with regular, random audits of certain records to ensure that they are maintained in accordance with the procedures. *See* Exhibit F hereto.

Court Appearances (PHA Response)

As noted in the OIG Report, PHAPD has adequate procedures for managing court appearances by its officers. The problem in this particular instance, also noted in the OIG Report, was that the records maintained by PHAPD were inadvertently discarded. Accordingly, the issue raised in the OIG Report is not one of excessive overtime paid by PHAPD for court appearances; rather it is the issue of maintaining adequate records to ensure that such overtime is justified pursuant to already established PHAPD procedures.

To address this issue, the PHA has created and tasked the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office with developing, among other policies, a records management and retention policy. The policy implemented by the new PHAPD administrations requires maintenance of court appearance overtime records for a period of five (5) years. *See* Exhibit F hereto. Moreover, all PHAPD overtime, including overtime for Court appearances, must be personally approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources. *See* Exhibit D hereto.

Although such procedures should ensure that overtime for court appearances is justified and able to be tracked, it is impossible to predict the amount of overtime required for court appearances. This is a result of the substantial control exercised by the City of Philadelphia District Attorney's Office in requiring PHAPD officers to make court appearances.³ However, when the District Attorney requires such court appearances, the PHAPD will now be better situated to track the officers making the appearances and the time spent.

³ The PHAPD Chief has initiated discussions with the District Attorney's office to address this issue.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

2B. The PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office will oversee a document maintenance and retention policy, which will, among other things, require court appearance documents related to overtime payments to be maintained for five (5) years. See Exhibit F hereto. In addition, all overtime for PHAPD court appearances must be personally approved by the General Manager of Human Resources.

2C. The PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office has assigned a detective and paralegal to review periodically documentation supporting court appearances by monitoring the administrative process of the Court Liaison Unit. In addition, the Court Liaison Unit has been taken out of the control of the PHAPD Commander of Operations and placed under the administrative command of the PHAPD Staff Services Officer.

Furthermore, the PHA OIG will schedule a follow-up audit in its Audit Plan for fiscal year 2001 to evaluate the corrective actions taken by the PHAPD on overtime. The PHA OIG audit will include reviews of the DARs and other records as is necessary to justify and document PHAPD overtime charges.

Processing Arrests (PHA Response)

The present PHA administration has tasked the PHAPD to establish protocols and procedures to ensure that officers prepare complete incident reports, including providing information showing their time-out and time-in. This process is being undertaken by the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office.

Significantly, the OIG Report references “slating” time to gauge when an officer should return to duty after an arrest, and cites a City PD officer for the proposition that an officer should return to duty within approximately one hour of the “slating time.” However, there is not enough information in the OIG Report to respond adequately to that statement. Arrests for different types of crimes trigger different arrest and slating procedures. There are arrests modes for “summary” offenses, which require the officer to transport the offender to the Police District for identification, for the possible want, and the preparation of the summary citation.

On arrival at the Police District, the citation and offender are “booked” (slated) into the arrest system. This procedure normally takes less than two hours from the moment of arrest until “slating time.” However, many variables effect the slating time, including:

1. Availability of transportation of the offender from the scene of arrest to the District of occurrence;
2. Availability of information (wanted file);
3. A “hit” on the offender indicating he/she is wanted; and
4. Backlog of arrests and processing.

Arrests for indictable offenses will increase the amount of “out of service” time due to a more involved process. In addition to the procedures outlined above for indictable cases, a City PD Detective initiates an investigation into the crime. Usually the patrol officers are interviewed by the Detective first, and later released. However, certain arrests involve more

complicated procedures. For example, an arrest for the possession of a weapon requires that the officer give an interview, prepare a property receipt for the weapon, transport the weapon to the City PD Headquarters, and have the weapon logged into the City PD ballistics section. The officer then has to return to his or her area of assignment, or if appropriate, report off duty.

The above is only a limited example; other types of arrests (homicides, assaults, etc.) can create a different, more complex set of circumstances, which may increase slating time.

Recommendation (PHA Response):

2D-2G. PHA will develop a work plan and implement the recommendations set forth in the OIG Report. In addition, PHAPD will develop a centralized PHAPD records management division that will maintain all incident reports and supplemental records of the PHAPD. Moreover, the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office will undertake regular, random audits of the arrest paperwork turned in to the PHAPD records management division.

Chief Special Assignments (PHA Response)

The issues raised in the OIG report are moot, as the "Chief Complaints" unit has been disbanded. Moreover, all PHAPD overtime requests now must receive pre-approval by the PHA General Manager for Human Resources.

PHAPD Participation in Law Enforcement Task Forces (PHA Response)

PHAPD's participation in State and Federal law enforcement task forces provide tangible benefits for PHA residents, whether the task forces' emphasis is on PHA property or on nearby neighborhoods. For example, many of the task forces in which PHAPD officers have been involved relate to drug enforcement and elimination programs, the results of which directly impact PHA residents. Although the PHAPD is only participating in one task force at present, in connection with which it has entered into a "Standard State and Local Task Force Agreement" with the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") (*see* Exhibit G hereto), it is conceivable that PHAPD officers will be involved in other State and Federal task forces in the future for the benefit of PHA residents. However, such task forces will be entered into with a clear understanding of project objectives and purpose, similar to the DEA task force agreement.

In prior administrations there was little oversight over PHAPD officers' participation in task force initiatives with State and Federal law enforcement organizations. Pursuant to the systemic management changes implemented elsewhere by Mr. Greene, the present administration also has implemented a policy to reduce the administrative problems associated with PHAPD participation in State and Federal task forces. Specifically, the State or Federal agency to which a PHAPD officer is assigned reviews and signs the PHAPD officer's DAR. This control will allow PHA to recover reimbursement costs from State and Federal agencies so that PHA operating funds can be used to provide residents with core services.

Historically, overtime has also been a problem associated with PHAPD participation in State and Federal task forces. The present PHA administration had, prior to receiving the OIG Report, implemented a policy providing that PHAPD overtime will not be issued unless approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources. *See* Exhibit D

hereto. Accordingly, the overtime payments associated with PHAPD participation in task forces in past administrations will be significantly reduced.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

2J-2N. The PHA will consider and investigate the feasibility of implementing the OIG Report recommendations. In addition, PHA has already implemented a system for ensuring reimbursement from State and Federal agencies for PHAPD participation in task force assignments. The policy provides for the participating agency to review, and sign off on, the PHAPD officer's signed DAR. Moreover, all PHAPD overtime requests associated with State or Federal task forces are required to receive pre-approval by the PHA General Manager for Human Resources.

Payments for Unidentified Overtime Charges (PHA Response)

In prior PHAPD administrations there was a lack of uniformity in the way supervisors documented some overtime expenditures. The PHA has tasked the present PHAPD management with reviewing this practice and implementing a uniform system for recording overtime.

Recommendation (PHA Response):

2P. The PHAPD will develop and implement a policy explaining the purpose of the DAR, the information to be entered on the DAR, and how the DAR is to be used by PHAPD supervisors. This policy will include administrative requirements for entering the amount and purpose of officer overtime, as well as instructions for preparing related documents that support overtime charges, such as the daily roster lists and overtime logs.

In addition, since 1998 the PHAPD has required pre-approval for all overtime and compensatory time earned by PHAPD employees. See Exhibits D and E hereto. This form requires justification for each hour of overtime and compensatory time worked. The form is signed by Command Staff Personnel and then forwarded to the Executive Office.

Supervisory Compensatory Time (PHA Response)

The issues raised in OIG Report were the result of a lack of oversight of PHAPD supervisory personnel in prior administrations. This has been remedied by requiring pre-approval by the Executive Director for all compensatory time. *See* Exhibit E hereto. Pursuant to the Executive Director's requirement that all compensatory time be pre-approved, the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office has assigned a detective to oversee PHAPD supervisory compensatory time to ensure that adequate records are maintained and returned, and that the requirement of one hour of compensatory time per each hour of overtime work is followed. In addition, the PHA OIG has audit oversight responsibility for supervisory compensatory time.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

2Q. PHA will advise all PHAPD supervisors that they are entitled to receive only one hour of compensatory time for each hour worked beyond the normal workday, with the exception of holidays, which are credited at double compensatory time.

2R. PHA is also establishing a control, through the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office, so that supervisor compensatory time is subject to regular audits. In addition, since 1998 the PHAPD has required pre-approval for all compensatory time and justification for each hour worked for overtime or compensatory time.

Providing Security for Senior PHA Officials (PHA Response)

Mr. Greene, the present Executive Director, does not have PHAPD officers assigned to him. The policy of assigning PHAPD officers to the Executive Director was maintained in the prior PHA administration, but has been extinguished by the present administration. Mr. Greene does have two non-PHAPD personnel accompany him to public appearances related solely to PHA business. Likewise, no other PHA executive is assigned PHAPD police officer protection. There is a PHAPD officer assigned to the PHA building strictly for security purposes.

However, the nature of the Executive Director's position, and that of other Executive Staff members, as well as their public exposure in sometimes volatile situations, may from time to time require security from PHAPD officers. It is anticipated that such occasions will be rare. When such a situation does arise, it will be handled on a case-by-case basis, depending upon the level of danger and immediacy of the threat. The final determination regarding PHAPD officer protection will be made by the PHA Executive Director and the PHAPD Chief.

Recommendation (PHA Response):

2S. A memorandum has been issued setting forth the policy for executive staff security. *See* Exhibit H hereto. Consequently, no PHAPD officers will be assigned to PHA executive staff members absent valid safety concerns and approval.

C. Payroll Computations (PHA Response)

The PHAPD administers payroll manually, which occasionally results in relatively minor calculation errors. The PHA is in the process of investigating the upgrade of its computer system, whereby the DAR's will be processed by computer, which in turn will allow payroll calculations and coding to be performed electronically, minimizing errors. It is believed that this change will significantly decrease future calculation errors.

In addition, PHA requests from the OIG a list of all PHAPD personnel who were either overpaid and underpaid as a result of possible calculation errors. Upon review and investigation of this information, PHA would seek restitution of overpayments and would pay those employees who were underpaid.

Recommendation (PHA Response):

2T-2W. PHA agrees to investigate and implement, if appropriate, the recommendations set forth in the OIG Report. The PHA is the process of investigating the upgrade of its computer system, whereby the DAR's will be processed by computer, which in turn will allow payroll calculations and coding to be performed electronically.

In addition, PHA requests from the OIG a list of all PHAPD personnel who were either overpaid and underpaid as a result of a possible calculation error.

Hiring Additional Police Officers (PHA Response)

Under the FY 1993 Drug Elimination Grant ("DEG"), the PHA hired twenty new officers, all of whom graduated from the City of Philadelphia Police Academy. Attached as Exhibit I hereto is a list of the officers. This grant was for a two-year period. In FY 1995 and again in FY 1997, PHA received additional grants to continue to employ the officers hired in FY 1993. The PHA believed, and still believes, that the language in the grants allowed use of grant funds to continue the officers' employment.

Under the FY 1996 Drug Elimination Grant, the PHA hired sixteen officers, all of whom graduated from the City of Philadelphia Police Academy. Attached as Exhibit I hereto is a list of those officers. This grant was also for a two-year period, and in FY 1998 PHA received authorization to continue to employ those sixteen officers. The PHA believed, and continues to believe, that these funds also could be used to continue the employment of those officers. In addition, all 36 of the officers PHA hired through the DEG program performed drug elimination work, as the grants required.

As discussed in a meeting between PHA staff, counsel for PHA, and Office of Inspector General staff subsequent to the issuance of the draft report, the number of funded positions in the chart titled "Actual and Funded PHA Officers" is misstated. The number of funded officers was as follows:

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Operating</u>	<u>Section 8</u>	<u>Comp. Grant 164</u>	<u>Comp. Grant 169</u>	<u>DEG</u>
1995	243	150	1	46	26	20
1996	242	150	0	46	26	20
1997	258	150	0	46	26	36 ⁴

Therefore, the actual "variance" between the number of funded officers and the number of actual officers is as shown in the table below:

⁴ PHA received the approval for the additional 16 officers in December 1996, but these officers were not hired and DEG funds were not expended until February 1997.

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Total Funded</u>	<u>Total Actual</u>	<u>Variance</u>
1995	243	249	(5)
1996	242	237	5
1997	258	245	13

The total actual number of officers shown in the chart above was taken directly from the OIG report.

The variance between the funded and actual number of officers was caused by two forces beyond the control of PHA. First, PHA has had tremendous difficulty recruiting and retaining qualified officers. Police departments in some of the counties surrounding Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia Police Department provide higher compensation to their officers. PHA officers therefore often seek employment with those departments after PHA has funded their training at the City of Philadelphia Police Academy.

In addition, during periods of strong economic growth, as experienced in recent years, police departments in general have had difficulty recruiting and keeping officers because of attractive alternatives in the private sector. PHA was even more susceptible to this phenomenon because it has less status in the eyes of some recruits and offered less money than many other police departments. PHA continues to have difficulty recruiting and keeping qualified officers.

PHA also maintained vacancies in its operating budget area because of shortfalls in funding by HUD. In fiscal years 1995, 1996 and 1997, PHA had funding shortfalls of 5%, 4% and 11%, respectively. To make up these shortfalls, the prior administration maintained vacancies in the PHAPD and in other areas.

Despite the recruiting and funding difficulties, PHA employed officers in the drug elimination area up to the limits of the DEG funding. If an opening arose in the DEG area, PHA

would often transfer an officer from its operating budget area to the drug elimination area because PHA viewed drug elimination as one of its highest priorities. Once an officer was transferred from the operating area to the drug elimination area on PHA financial records, that officer's duties would also change to drug elimination work. PHA therefore believes that all DEG funding was properly used for drug elimination work, as intended by the grants.

Moreover, the DEG funds were used to augment, and not to supplant the existing PHA police force. The existing force continued to perform its duties as outlined in the MOU with the City, which was a concern addressed in Finding 1 of the OIG Report, while the DEG funded officers supplemented that existing force by concentrating exclusively on drug elimination work. It is therefore PHA's belief that it used the DEG funds as intended in the grant – to supplement the existing force with officers that performed exclusive drug elimination work. While it is true that the actual number of non-DEG funded officers decreased slightly, the reasons for that decrease were outside of PHA's control.

Finally, consistent with the concerns expressed in Finding 1 of the OIG Report, the present PHA administration has begun to focus more on the provision of core services, such as maintenance at PHA facilities, while restructuring the PHAPD, which will now focus on providing "targeted" police services, such as drug elimination programs, to supplement City PD services to PHA residents.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

3A-3C. As discussed above, under the FY 1993 Drug Elimination Grant, the PHA hired twenty new officers, all of whom graduated from the Police Academy. See Exhibit I hereto. This grant was for a two-year period. In FY 1995 and again in FY 1997, PHA

received additional grants to continue to employ the officers hired in FY 1993. The PHA believed, and still believes, that the language in the grants allowed use of grant funds to continue their employment.

Under the FY 1996 Drug Elimination Grant, the PHA hired sixteen officers, all of whom graduated from the Police Academy. *See* Exhibit I hereto. This grant was also for a two-year period, and in FY 1998 PHA received authorization to continue to employ those sixteen officers. The PHA also believed, and continues to believe, that these funds could be used to continue the employment of those officers.

In addition, all 36 of those officers performed drug elimination work, as the grants required. While the number of core – non-DEG funded – officers did decline in fiscal years 1995 through 1997 because of recruiting and retention problems, PHA assigned officers to drug elimination work up to the limit of DEG funding. These officers supplemented the core, non-DEG funded officers, and performed the services required of the PHAPD pursuant to the MOU between the PHA and the City.

DEG Funded Equipment Purchases (PHA Response)

In prior PHA administrations, PHA executives used PHAPD vehicles purchased with DEG funds. The present administration has implemented a policy providing that no PHAPD vehicles purchased with DEG funds are used by executive staff. PHA will permit the use of these vehicles only by PHAPD personnel.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

3D. Attached as Exhibit J hereto is a certification by the current Executive Director of the PHA and the Chief of Police for the PHA, stating that the three DEG funded vehicles have been returned to the PHAPD.

3E. PHA has assigned an employee to develop and implement a written procedure that ensures that DEG funded vehicles are utilized by Police personnel only, and tracked accordingly. *See* Exhibit K hereto.


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4497
Chairman of the Board of Commissioners, Philadelphia Housing Authority

PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY

12 South 23RD Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103-4497
215-684-4000



Carl R. Greene
Executive Director

October 27, 1999

Mr. David Niemiec, Office of Inspector General
U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development
The Wanamaker Building, 10th Floor
100 Penn Square East
Philadelphia, PA 19107-0500

Dear Mr. Niemiec:

Attached is our detailed response to the Office of Inspector General's review of the Philadelphia Housing Authority's (PHA) Police Department.

Please note that the response references a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the City and PHA, which we are in the process of developing jointly. It is anticipated that the MOU will be finalized in the next sixty (60) days, at which time we will forward a copy to your office.

Thank you for your continued cooperation throughout this process. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or Michael Leithead, Executive Deputy Director, at 215-684-4025.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Carl R. Greene', written over a light blue horizontal line.

Carl R. Greene
Executive Director

CRG/ed

cc: Michael J. Leithead, Executive Deputy Director

PHA 24474

**PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY RESPONSE TO
AUDIT REPORT OF OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

TO: David J. Niemiec, Acting District Inspector General for Audit, Mid-Atlantic
FROM: Carl Greene, Executive Director, Philadelphia Housing Authority
SUBJECT: Response to Review of the Philadelphia Housing Authority's Police Department

Introduction (OIG)

We conducted a review of Philadelphia Housing Authority's police department. The review was conducted to evaluate the propriety of the overtime payments that were made to its staff. As part of our review we also attempted to determine the level of baseline police services being provided to the Housing Authority by the City of Philadelphia and to relate those services to what should be provided under the terms of their cooperation agreement.

In conducting our review, we examined Authority policies, procedures, and records and interviewed Authority personnel. We also met with staff from and examined records maintained by other organizations with which the police department dealt in an effort to obtain needed documents and information.

Our review was conducted between January 1998 and July 1999 and focused on overtime that was paid between 1995 and 1997. The current Executive Director significantly curtailed overtime in the Authority's police department in 1998. With the reduction in overtime, the extent of the problems that we observed between 1995 and 1997 have been significantly diminished. Our review of baseline services was based on information that was available at July 1999.

Introduction (PHA Response)

In response to the Office of Inspector General's (the "OIG") Audit Report of the Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department (the "OIG Report"), the Philadelphia Housing Authority (the "PHA") reviewed numerous procedures and policies that have been implemented under current PHA management, which began in March 1998 with the appointment of Carl Greene as Executive Director of the PHA. The PHA also met with its staff members and examined some of those records that the OIG examined. The PHA review and preparation of this response was conducted over a three-week time period.

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Mr. Greene is the former Executive Director of the Detroit, Michigan Housing Commission ("DHC"). As Executive Director of DHC, Mr. Greene was responsible for providing leadership and implementing systemic policy changes that directly improved the services provided to DHC residents, as well as their quality of life, including improving the DHC's Public Housing Management Assessment Program ("PHMAP") status with the U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development by increasing its PHMAP scores from 37.60 to 82.98 over a three year period.

When Mr. Greene was hired as PHA Executive Director, he recognized systemic problems in the PHA, including a history of mismanagement of the PHA Police Department ("PHAPD"). Reforming and restructuring the PHAPD was, and remains, a top priority in the Greene administration. Mr. Greene recognized the limitations of PHA's operating budget, which could not effectively support a full-scale police force and at the same time provide PHA residents with core services. Accordingly, Mr. Greene's administration has begun to focus on the provision of core services, such as maintenance at PHA facilities, while restructuring the PHAPD, which will now focus on providing "targeted" police services, such as drug elimination programs, to supplement police services that the City of Philadelphia Police Department (the "City PD") provides to PHA residents.

In furtherance of Mr. Greene's policy for refocusing the activities of the PHAPD, Richard Zappile was hired as PHAPD Chief on June 11, 1999 to help implement a number of reforms. Chief Zappile spent 30 years in the City PD, achieving the rank of Deputy Commissioner for Operations, the second ranking position in the City PD. During his tenure with the City PD, Chief Zappile was responsible for a number of reforms, including decentralizing all detective functions to the field commander level, reorganizing the City PD

Human Relations Department and introducing quality management principles, and curbing overtime abuses in the City PD Homicide Department. After leaving the City PD, Chief Zappile was appointed Deputy Mayor of Philadelphia by Mayor Rendell, with responsibility for Criminal Justice Programs. At Mr. Greene's direction, PHAPD Chief Zappile has drafted and initiated an operational plan to overhaul the PHAPD and institute those reformation policies and programs envisioned by Mr. Greene. *See Exhibit A.*

In addition, in August 1999, the PHAPD hired Nancy Hartsough to head the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office, which has oversight of some of the issues raised in the OIG Report, including overtime usage and developing records management and retention systems. Ms. Hartsough, a former Philadelphia Assistant District Attorney, will work with a staff of 17 individuals, consisting of 13 detectives, some of whom are assigned specific managerial oversight and auditing responsibility, one lieutenant, one sergeant, and an administrative aide/paralegal.

Summary (OIG)

Police services need to be provided to the residents of the Philadelphia Housing Authority in a more organized, coordinated, and controlled fashion. While our review was conducted to look into various complaints regarding the administration of overtime at the Authority's police department, it is apparent that there are some very fundamental matters affecting the management and operation of the police department that need to be addressed by the Housing Authority and the City of Philadelphia.

While the City is responsible for providing Housing Authority residents with a certain level of police services under its Cooperation Agreement with the Authority, neither the Housing Authority nor the City know what level of services should be provided or the level of services that are being provided. As a consequence, the Authority's police department has become involved in the provision of a wide variety of services to its tenants, some of which are supplanting, not augmenting, services which should be provided by the City. There needs to be a clear delineation of the duties and responsibilities of both police departments. This is especially important because of the differing staff qualifications which the organizations have.

The Philadelphia Housing Authority's police department needed to strengthen substantially the controls it maintained over certain aspects of its operations. It lacked certain policies and procedures governing the payment of overtime; did not, on occasion follow policies and procedures when they existed; paid certain employees noteworthy amounts of overtime even though pertinent records were not kept or maintained; and participated in activities which had no apparent relationship to the Authority's operations or the provision of police services to its tenants. Finally, there were several instances in which the PHA's use of Drug Elimination Grant funds were not consistent with its grant application.

Our report contains a variety of recommendations that need to be implemented if the Housing Authority's police department is going to function efficiently and effectively. Among those recommendations are that the Housing Authority collaborate with the City in determining a quantifiable and measurable level of baseline services to be provided by the City and develop and implement a plan to supplement those services. Additionally, the Authority needs to implement various policies and procedures to assure that the apparent abuse of overtime that occurred in the past does not recur, as well as to assure that Drug Elimination Grant funds are used for their intended purposes. Since payroll preparation was essentially a manual operation with frequent errors in the calculation of amounts due to employees, we believe the process should be automated to reduce the frequency of errors that occurred.

Summary (PHA Response)

The PHAPD and City PD have opened discussions concerning their respective responsibilities for providing PHA residents with police services, including the provision of "baseline services" by the City PD. Through open communication and ongoing dialogue between the two police departments, and stronger leadership at the PHA executive level, a clear delineation of duties and responsibilities between the PHAPD and City PD is being established and will be maintained.

PHA Executive Director Greene, with the assistance of the PHAPD Chief and the Integrity and Accountability Office, has also substantially strengthened controls of those aspects of the PHAPD addressed in the OIG Report, including the establishment of policies and procedures governing the payment of overtime and the establishment of records management and retention policies. In addition, the PHA Office of Inspector General ("PHA OIG") has scheduled

audits of the PHAPD in its Audit Plan for 2001 to ensure that the steps taken to curb past overtime abuses are in place, functioning and effective.

Prior to receiving the OIG Report, the PHA and PHAPD had already implemented a number of policies and procedures that address and remedy many of the issues raised in the OIG Report. In addition, the PHA and PHAPD have taken steps to implement other recommendations set forth in the OIG Report, including investigating the implementation of an automated payroll system.

Background (OIG)

The City's obligation to provide police services to the residents of public housing is part of the cooperation agreement the PHA executed with the City of Philadelphia on May 19, 1950. This agreement provides that the City, without cost or charge to the PHA, will furnish or cause to be furnished to the PHA's tenants, the same public services and facilities which are being furnished without cost or charge to other dwellings and inhabitants of the city. These services include Police and health protection.

The PHA created its own police department in February 1979 because the PHA wanted to provide the residents of public housing greater security and protection than they were getting from the Philadelphia Police Department (City PD). Since that time, the PHAPD has emerged as a full force police department with duties similar to the municipal police, such as making arrest and conducting investigations.

Today, the PHAPD consists of approximately 317 total personnel, of whom 182 are police officers.¹ The remainder are supervisors, detectives, dispatchers, clerical and lobby monitor personnel.

According to a 1997 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the PHAPD and the City PD, the PHAPD is to supplement the City PD's police coverage provided for under the Cooperation Agreement. The City PD is to retain primary responsibility for investigating all homicides, rapes, felonies and misdemeanors. The MOU did not reduce existing City PD responsibilities at public housing developments, including responding to 911 calls. Neither the MOU nor the Cooperation Agreement stipulate, in quantitative and measurable terms, the level of baseline services the City PD is to provide PHA residents.

¹ Contrary to the OIG Report's assertion that "the PHAPD consists of approximately 317 total personnel, of whom 182 are police officers," in fact the PHAPD presently consists of 257 total personnel, of whom 182 are police officers.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1 (OIG): PHAPD Resources Used to Provide Baseline Police Services at PHA Developments

Tenant safety and security are integral parts of PHA operations. HUD and Federal Law Enforcement organizations have devoted, and continue to devote, substantial resources to address criminal activity in and around public housing locations. In Philadelphia, both the City and the PHA (with HUD funding assistance), have important roles to maintain a safe living environment for PHA residents.

The City's obligation to provide police services to the residents of public housing is part of the Cooperation Agreement the PHA executed with the City of Philadelphia on May 19, 1950. This agreement provides that the City, without cost or charge to the PHA, will furnish or cause to be furnished to the PHA's tenants, the same public services and facilities which are being furnished without cost or charge to other dwellings and inhabitants of the city. These services include police and health protection.

The PHA created its own police department in February 1979 because the PHA wanted to provide the residents of public housing greater security and protection than they were getting from the Philadelphia Police Department (City PD). Since that time, the PHAPD has emerged as a full force police department with duties similar to the municipal police, such as making arrest and conducting investigations.

Today, the PHAPD consists of approximately 317 total personnel, of whom 182 are police officers. The remainder are supervisors, detectives, dispatchers, clerical and lobby monitor personnel. The following schedule displays a four year history of the substantial resources the PHA has dedicated to tenant safety and security.

PROGRAM	1995	1996	1997	1998
Operating Subsidiary	\$ 8,218,233	\$ 8,234,938	\$ 8,551,710	\$ 8,735,534
Drug Elimination Grant	2,641,125	2,642,750	2,784,420	4,934,280
Comp Grant	6,387,670	7,042,697	10,785,329	3,650,000
Vacancy Reduction	853,932			
Total	\$18,100,960	\$17,920,385	\$22,121,459	\$17,319,814

The creation of the PHAPD did not lessen the City PD's responsibility for servicing PHA developments. The City PD is to provide the same baseline services to public housing residents as it provides to all other residents in its jurisdiction. Baseline services, as defined by HUD in its Drug Elimination Grant Notice of Funding Availability, are the deployment of city and county-wide police resources, to respond to crime and other public safety incidents, including 911 communications, processing calls for service, routine patrol, police officer response to calls for service and investigative follow-up of criminal activity.

According to a 1997 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the PHAPD and the City PD, the PHAPD is to supplement the City PD's police coverage provided for under the Cooperation Agreement. The City PD is to retain primary responsibility for investigating all homicides, rapes, felonies and misdemeanors. The MOU did not reduce existing City PD responsibilities at public housing developments, including responding to 911 calls.

Neither the MOU nor the Cooperation Agreement stipulate, in quantitative and measurable terms, the level of baseline services the City PD is to provide PHA residents. As a consequence, the PHAPD does not have a standard against which to measure the actual City PD performance. We found that PHAPD services, in large measure, were taking the place of, rather than supplementing, some baseline City PD services. The PHA has been aware of this situation for some time. In a 1980 memorandum to the PHA Executive Director, the PHA's General Counsel noted that the PHA had been forced to assume the role of police in the developments and that this extra service had added to an already overburdened PHA budget. Also, a 1992 memorandum from the PHAPD Chief to the PHA Executive Director explained that "the Philadelphia Police Department, while mandated to provide protective services to all citizens and property in the City of Philadelphia, does not routinely patrol various developments. While supposedly required to respond to emergency calls from the sites, the Philadelphia Police Department does not always so respond. In fact, they refer all such calls to the PHAPD radio room for service and will only respond if notified that the PHAPD cannot handle the job."

More recently, TAG Associates, a consultant the PHA hired to review overall operations, issued a report dated August 1998 that included findings on the PHAPD. One issue the report raised was the lack of City PD presence in the PHA developments. TAG Associates recommended that the PHA use its police for above baseline services and not replace the City for 911 and routine patrol services. The consultant noted that since PHAPD duplicates many of the services provided by the City PD, the City continues to remove themselves from public housing. Consequently, the PHAPD community policing suffers because they are responding to service calls that should be provided by the City PD.

An Acting PHAPD Chief (temporarily detailed from the City PD) in an August 26, 1998 response to the TAG Associates Report acknowledged that the City PD does not have specific units dedicated to public housing. He noted that "on some occasions the City PD will forward a 911 call to our officers [the PHAPD], but in the vast majority of cases we are answering calls for service that come to our radio room and in some incidents officers will encounter an incident or make a sight arrest." We learned from a PHAPD supervisor that many tenants call the PHAPD for service directly because tenants know, through experience, they will get a faster response time from PHAPD officers than they will from the City PD.

Our review substantiated the large volume of calls for police services received by the PHAPD. During 1998, the City PD referred thousands of 911 calls to the PHAPD for service, though the PHAPD did not respond to all the 911 referrals. PHAPD personnel said that 75 percent of the 911 calls they responded to were answered solely by the PHAPD officers. Our review confirmed this condition. A sample of 911 calls we reviewed found that 85 percent of the calls were responded to by PHAPD officers. There were even instances where the City PD referred 911 calls to the PHAPD for service that had nothing to do with PHA developments.

For years, the PHA has been spending its funds to provide tenants with the baseline police services each PHA tenant is entitled to receive at City expense. Had the City fulfilled its obligations to the PHA, and provided baseline police services, the PHAPD's resources could have been used to greater effect by supplementing the City PD's services. Or, the PHA could have used some of these resources for housing operations.

The PHA Executive Director told us that his background, skills, and interests are in the housing business and not the police business. Because of the City PD's expertise, the PHA Executive Director has suggested the City PD take over the PHAPD. The PHA would continue to fund the City PD the cost of the housing police. This option could cause the PHAPD to become a more effective organization due to the organizational strength and managerial skills of City PD personnel. However, this course does not address the central issue of getting the City PD to provide PHA developments with baseline police services. So, though the City PD may be able to use PHAPD resources more effectively than had been administered by the PHAPD, the PHA will, in effect, continue to pay the City for police services which the City is already obligated to provide to the PHA's tenants.

The funding that HUD provides for PHA safety and security should be used to provide services above baseline and not to provide baseline services. The terms of both the ACC and Cooperation Agreement give HUD a cause of action against the PHA, the City, or both, if either or both failed to comply with their obligations under the Cooperation Agreement. Further, court decisions have held that a public housing authority can bring mandamus against a local governing body to do what is necessary under the Cooperative Agreement. While bringing mandamus against the City to get it to honor the terms of the Cooperation Agreement may be contentious and painful to pursue, it may become the only course open to the PHA to get the City to provide residents with the police services they deserve.

Recommendations (OIG):

We recommend that HUD direct the PHA to:

- 1A. Collaborate with the City to determine a quantifiable and measurable level of baseline police services the City PD will provide to PHA developments. The level of City police services to PHA developments must be comparable in quantity and quality to the police services provided to other residents of the city.
- 1B. Monitor whether or not the City PD is providing the baseline police services.

If the City PD is providing the baseline services:
- 1C. Establish a plan to use the HUD funding to supplement baseline services.

If the City PD does not provide baseline police services:

- 1D. Take legal action to obtain the services from the City, or explore, with HUD, other ways to obtain compliance, i.e., withholding CDBG, HOME or other types of Federal funding from the City.

Finding 1 (PHA Response): PHAPD Resources Used to Provide Baseline Police Services at PHA Developments

The PHAPD was established in 1979 to supplement baseline services provided by the City PD to residents of the PHA. At the time of the audited years (1995-1997), there was no accurate degree of measurement on what baseline services the City PD was to provide to PHA residents, what services were actually being provided to PHA residents, or what calls for service the City PD were responding to in PHA facilities. On taking office in March 1998, Mr. Greene identified these deficiencies and charted a course of action to remedy the problems.

The PHAPD has initiated communications with City PD officials, including City PD Commissioner Timoney to, among other things, establish a quantifiable definition of the “baseline services” the City PD is to provide PHA residents, as well as a framework to maintain and monitor these services.² See Exhibit B. Without first establishing a definition of “baseline services,” it is impossible to determine whether, and to what extent, the City PD is providing such services

The PHA has also submitted to the City PD a draft updated Memorandum of Understanding for Coordination of Law Enforcement Responsibilities (the “updated MOU”).

The updated MOU includes, among others, the following delineation of services:

- a. The City PD shall be responsible for all 911 assignments in PHA scattered sites;

² Gordon Wasserman, City PD Commissioner Timoney’s Chief of Staff, has been assigned as the primary liaison between the PHAPD and the City PD. Mr. Wasserman and the PHAPD Chief have been meeting approximately once a week to discuss issues that effect both the City PD and PHAPD.

- b. In areas of concurrent jurisdiction, the City PD shall assume primary responsibility for investigations and the PHAPD shall assist;
- c. The PHAPD and City PD shall assign members of their command staffs as liaison officers to coordinate efforts of the respective departments to concerning the provision of services to PHA residents; and
- d. The PHAPD and City PD shall share weekly crime statistic information.

Mr. Greene further addressed the issue of City PD services by commissioning, in August 1998, TAG Associates to prepare a report (the "TAG Report"), which, in part, addressed the City PD's involvement at PHA facilities. Based in part upon the TAG Report findings, Mr. Greene implemented a number of the programs and policies discussed in this response. In addition, Mr. Greene hired an experienced law enforcement officer, Richard Zappile, to help develop, refine and implement these programs and policies.

Among other things, under Chief Zappile the PHAPD is implementing site-based policing, especially at sites where quality of life issues have deteriorated and there is a need for community based policing. See Exhibit C hereto. This program will supplement, as opposed to supplant, baseline services that the City PD is providing to PHA residents.

Moreover, upon taking control of the PHA, Mr. Greene determined that the PHA operating budget could not support both core services, such as maintenance of PHA facilities, and public safety services, such as a full-service police department like the PHAPD. Consequently, the PHAPD is shifting focus from a "full-service" police department to a "targeted" department that would provide supplemental services to the City PD, including site-based policing, along with other anti-crime and drug elimination programs. The initiation of these and other programs will assist in lowering the crime rate at PHA facilities and improving the quality of life for PHA residents without detracting from core services.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

1A. A draft updated MOU has been submitted to the City that will establish a quantifiable and measurable level of baseline police services the City PD will provide to PHA residents. This updated MOU will be entered into between the PHA and the City of Philadelphia and will supercede the MOU from the previous administration.

1B. Effective January, 2000, the City PD will be able to provide the PHAPD electronically with the calls for service and founded Part I (indictable offenses) and Part II (misdemeanors) crimes and/or arrests on PHA properties.

1C. Based on the information received from the City PD, the PHAPD will be able to deploy site-based policing, along with specialized units (ACT teams, PHAPD Drug Task Forces, etc.) to curtail any quantitative problems identified from the information received from the City PD. This will supplement City PD services in PHA facilities.

In addition, the PHAPD has made arrangements with the City PD to allow PHAPD police officers and City PD police officers to communicate via radio while on duty. The long-range goal is to eliminate the PHAPD radio functions and have all radio functions operated by the City PD.

At this point, it is premature to consider legal remedies to enforce the City's responsibility to provide "baseline services" to PHA residents, as there is no measurable definition of "baseline services" that the City may or may not be providing. New PHA leadership is in the process of developing the "baseline services" definition with the City. Unless and until such a definition is established, and the PHA can monitor the City PD's provision of such services, it is counterproductive to consider litigation as an option to addressing this issue

Finding 2 (OIG): Better Controls Should Be Exercised Over PHAPD Overtime

We reviewed the way the PHAPD authorized, justified, approved and supported the payment of overtime to its staff. We wanted to determine if the PHAPD had established effective overtime controls and if the controls were working satisfactorily. Our review was undertaken because of concerns that were raised about the way overtime was being administered by the PHAPD and covered overtime activities during fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997. The PHA has since taken action to significantly reduce the amount of overtime worked by its police department. However, we still believe a number of actions should be taken to help prevent the types of problems we observed from recurring.

We concluded that the PHAPD did not have effective controls and accountability over overtime. The preponderance of overtime was worked by a limited number of individuals and most of the overtime was either inadequately or improperly authorized, justified, approved or supported. Therefore, we believe the PHAPD lacked sufficient evidence to show that some of its officers were providing the level of services for which they were being compensated.

In the following sections to this finding, we discuss the types of problems that exist in the PHAPD's administration of overtime and the controls that should be established to help prevent them from happening again. We talk about how overtime was distributed to employees, management's oversight and accountability, and the types of errors that were made in calculating overtime wages. Because PHAPD overtime was poorly managed, we question whether the residents of the PHA received the type and amount of services to which they were entitled.

Finding 2 (PHA Response): Better Controls Should be Exercised over PHAPD Overtime

Mr. Greene inherited a PHAPD with a history of mismanagement. Aside from hiring an new PHAPD Chief, Mr. Greene has put in place a system of separation of duties, effective monitoring and oversight, and institutionalized oversight to remedy the historic problems with the PHAPD. Mr. Greene and his staff implemented these measures to ensure a system of checks and balances, so that no one individual or department is free from accountability or scrutiny.

For example, as noted in the OIG Report, the present PHA administration has taken action to reduce significantly the amount of overtime worked by the PHAPD. Specifically, overtime will no longer be allowed unless personally approved by the PHA General Manager of

Human Resources. *See* Exhibit D hereto. This protocol has already reduced, and will continue to reduce, overtime to those instances for which it is required and necessary. Moreover, a detective from the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office has been assigned to review overtime payments on a weekly basis. Finally, the PHA OIG will conduct audits of PHAPD overtime to ensure compliance with preexisting policies and that the measures adopted are, in fact, working effectively.

A. PHAPD Distribution of Overtime (OIG)

Labor is the single largest cost of the PHAPD and overtime wages were a significant component of labor during the period covered by our review. Overtime increased from \$1,002,363 in 1995 to \$1,892,271 in 1996, and to over \$2.3 million in 1997. In just two years, PHAPD overtime grew by 135 percent. PHAPD overtime was financed with Operating Subsidies, as well as Comprehensive and Drug Elimination Grants.

To control PHAPD's growing overtime expenditures the current PHA Executive Director implemented a policy whereby all requests for PHAPD overtime or compensatory time had to be approved in advance by the PHA's Executive Office. As depicted in the following graph, this action reduced overtime payments by 63 percent between 1997 and 1998.

[OIG Report Graph Omitted]

Our audit focused on the 30 PHAPD employees who received the greatest amounts of overtime and compensatory time between 1995 and 1997. Most of these employees were PHA police officers, but some were supervisors, one was a dispatcher and another was a detective. Our test period covering the officers, the dispatcher and detective consisted of 15 weeks of the 156 week period. We used available PHAPD records to determine why the PHAPD incurred the overtime during the 15 sample weeks. The Daily Attendance Report (DAR) is the PHAPD's primary information document in accounting for PHAPD personnel payroll. The categorization of overtime in our sample follows:

[OIG Report Pie Chart Omitted]

Our sample amounted to approximately eight percent of the officers, dispatchers and detectives employed by the PHAPD. This small number of employees received a relatively large share of the overtime.

[OIG Report Pie Chart Omitted]

The PHAPD did not have a policy to achieve an equitable allocation of overtime amongst its staff or to restrict the number of hours an officer could work in a day or a week. Also, the PHAPD union contract was silent regarding these issues. Further, why such a large volume of overtime was concentrated in so few PHAPD personnel either could not or would not be explained by senior PHA management personnel.

Many of the PHAPD personnel in our sample doubled and tripled their annual base pay with the overtime they received. Sometimes, officers claimed so many overtime hours that overwork was likely to adversely affect their abilities to perform satisfactorily. We found occasions where officers asserted they worked impossibly long hours of consecutive service. For example, two officers reported working 63 straight hours over a three day period with only a one hour break between the 47th and 48th hours. These same officers reported working entire weeks without a single day's rest.

The State of Pennsylvania recognized that working long hours can impede a police officer's effectiveness. Therefore, the State prescribed that for First Class Cities such as Philadelphia, police officers must be allowed at least twenty-four consecutive hours of rest in every calendar week. This mandatory rest period was established to prevent problems that could arise by having police officers work long overtime hours while armed.

Without a policy explaining how overtime would be fairly allocated within the PHAPD and procedures to assure the policy was working effectively, the PHAPD lacked and still lacks adequate management controls to properly administer its payroll system. The absence of a policy coupled with the manner in which overtime had been approved, helped to concentrate overtime in a small number of officers who doubled and tripled their annual base salaries, while the larger portion of PHAPD employees received little or no overtime. Further, while the PHAPD's policy provided that detectives, as well as supervisors, were entitled to compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay for hours worked beyond the normal workday, we identified one exception to this policy. The former PHAPD Chief authorized one detective to receive overtime pay in lieu of compensatory time and, as a result, the detective received overtime compensation of \$10,403 beyond what the detective would have received as compensatory time. We found no documentation which justified waiving the PHAPD policy in this case or that the waiver was approved by the PHA's Board of Commissioners.

Recommendation (OIG):

We recommend the PHA:

- 2A. Establish a policy that will provide for an equitable distribution and payment of overtime to PHAPD personnel. The policy should provide for: the payment of overtime only when it is properly authorized, supported, approved and certified as being worked by the employee and supervisor; the approval of overtime by a person at a higher level than the person's supervisor; mandatory rest periods for officers and limits to a safe level of the number of consecutive hours that can be worked by PHAPD officers; regular periodic reviews of overtime by the PHA's Office of Inspector

General; and the recovery of overtime payments from the affected individuals when the payments are not properly authorized, approved, or otherwise supported.

A. PHAPD Distribution of Overtime (PHA Response)

As noted in the OIG Report, the present PHA administration reduced 1998 PHAPD overtime payments to below 1995 levels, and approximately \$1.5 million below the 1997 level. The dramatic decrease in overtime payments to PHAPD officers is a direct result of new policies and stronger leadership in the PHA, including the policy that PHAPD overtime will not be issued unless personally approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources.

During the period audited (1995-1997, which was prior to the present administration) there was an abundance of mandatory and/or promised PHAPD coverage at sites designated by the PHAPD Chief and/or Executive Office. In the event of any absenteeism or shortage of manpower, overtime was authorized by the line supervisor, in many cases a sergeant, to fill the vacancy. There was no policy for the allocation of this cost and it was left to the discretion of a line supervisor without PHAPD Command Level approval or review. The practice of mandatory and/or promised coverage has been eliminated, thus there are no longer any projected overtime assignments as there had been in past administrations.

Also, during the time period examined in the OIG Report PHAPD maintained a Chief's Squad comprised of four (4) police officers who worked exclusively for the PHAPD Chief in handling complaints and other assignments. These four (4) employees were part of the OIG Report sampling, and the overtime dollars that unit amassed were covered in the pie chart for "Chief Complaint" (along with a portion of the arrest and court overtime cost associated thereto). Members of the PHAPD staff, with the exception of the Deputy Chief and Assistant to

the Chief, were not privy to the assignments handled by this select group. The Chief's Squad has been eliminated by the present PHA administration.

Overtime costs are now predominately attributed to arrests that extend beyond the normal working hours of employees, court appearance and other exigent circumstances that typically arise in law enforcement assignments. Consequently, overtime payments, while never certain in a given time period, will now be able to be predicted with greater certainty and can be budgeted accordingly. Moreover, the present administration has taken action against a PHAPD employee who was falsifying Daily Attendance Reports ("DAR") to obtain overtime payments, as well as a supervisor who approved the DARs. The investigation, conducted by PHA OIG, resulted in the termination of the employee. The supervisor is no longer with PHA.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

2A. PHA has implemented a policy providing that PHAPD overtime will not be issued unless personally approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources. See Exhibit D. The OIG Report recognizes that this policy, in part, has led to the reduction of overtime by approximately \$1.5 million from 1997 to 1998.

Due to the nature of law enforcement work generally, it is difficult to formulate a policy concerning the equitable distribution of overtime. However, PHA will be tracking overtime and compensatory time to spot trends in distribution, and will review its policies on an ongoing basis.

Another layer of oversight will be provided by the PHA OIG, which will schedule a follow-up audit in its Audit Plan for fiscal year 2001 to evaluate the corrective actions taken by the PHAPD on overtime. The PHA OIG audit will include tests of the DARs and other records as is

necessary to justify and document PHAPD overtime charges to ensure that the corrective measures taken are effective.

The PHA agrees with the OIG Report recommendation to implement a policy requiring mandatory rest periods for officers and limits the number of consecutive hours that PHAPD officers can work.

B. Oversight and Accountability for PHAPD Overtime (OIG)

The PHAPD had limited or ineffective controls and systems for managing, record keeping, accounting, supporting, and computing overtime for its police officers. Because of these weaknesses, we can not provide assurance that all the overtime paid by the PHAPD was:

- legitimate in many instances because of missing and altered documents
- justified and contributed to the protection of the PHA residents
- an effective use of PHAPD resources, and
- reasonable and limited to the time needed to effectively facilitate police duties.

The descriptions of the accountability and control conditions we observed for the various overtime categories follow:

B. Oversight and Accountability for PHAPD Overtime (PHA Response)

Although the issues raised in the OIG Report concerning PHAPD record keeping occurred prior to the present PHA administration, on taking office Mr. Greene recognized that this was a problem that needed to be addressed. Accordingly, the present PHA administration has hired a PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Officer who has been tasked to develop, among other policies, a records management and retention policy. The new PHAPD policy requires that all records be maintained for a period of five (5) years, with regular, random audits of certain records to ensure that they are maintained in accordance with the procedures. *See Exhibit F* hereto.

Court Appearances (OIG)

Officers make court appearances in response to subpoenas. Often, PHAPD officers received overtime compensation for court appearances. Eighteen percent, or \$25,134, of our sample involved overtime for court appearances. Although the PHAPD had controls for managing this type of overtime, the absence of needed documents precluded sufficient testing to assure the effectiveness of the controls. Using documentation available from other sources caused us to question whether some of the court appearance overtime claimed by PHAPD officers was justifiable.

The PHAPD had procedures for managing court appearances by its officers. If implemented, the procedures appeared to provide effective controls and included a separation of duties, documentation, and supervisory oversight. The procedures consisted of :

- A District Attorney (DA) issuing a subpoena to the PHAPD for an officer to appear in court
- The PHAPD Court Liaison Officer (CLO) creating a court notice in four parts -- two copies to the subpoenaed officer, one for the officer's supervisor/sergeant, one copy for the CLO.
- The officer taking one copy to court and having it time stamped in. After completing the court appearance, the DA would sign and note the time on the notice. Upon leaving the courthouse, the officer would again have the court notice time stamped out.
- The officer submitting the completed court notice to the officer's supervisor who is responsible for assuring it is complete, and the time spent on the court appearance is reasonable.
- The supervisor forwarding the court notice to the CLO. The CLO assures there is a subpoena to support the court notice.

We reviewed 283 overtime charges for court appearances to determine if the overtime paid to the officers as shown by the payroll records was adequately supported. Also, we wanted to assure there were subpoenas for the days overtime was claimed, together with court notices signed by the DA and showing the time stamped in and out. Finally, we wanted to confirm that supervisors reviewed the records to assure they were in order and that they supported the overtime that was paid to the officers.

We asked the CLO for the subpoenas and court notices that supported the overtime charges in our sample. The CLO did not have the subpoenas or court notices for any of the 283 overtime charges for court appearances. He said that all the subpoenas, court notices and schedules he prepared to summarize court appearances by PHAPD officers had been thrown away by mistake. Without the court notices, we lacked the means to verify the accuracy of the court appearance overtime that was claimed. However, we could still confirm whether or not the officers were subpoenaed for court appearances in other ways.

The Offices of the District Attorney and the Clerk of Quarter Sessions both maintain court case files. We reviewed 10 court case files that made up 11 court appearances in our sample. The files maintained by the District Attorney and the Clerk of Quarter Sessions contained identical information and supported the same 3 subpoenas out of the 11 court appearances claimed by officers. Though the other 8 files did not evidence subpoenas being issued to the PHAPD officers, we confirmed the case was in session for 7 of the other 8 court appearances in which the officers claimed overtime. The claim for court appearance overtime in the eighth instance appeared to be in error since the case was not in session on the day overtime was claimed.

The PHAPD did not have documentation to support the court appearance overtime paid to its officers. However, our very limited review of related documents from other sources caused us to question whether the PHAPD officers were correct in all their claims for court appearance overtime.

Recommendations (OIG):

We recommend that you advise the PHA to:

- 2B. Review the PHAPD's records management and retention policy to preclude the possibility of other records being accidentally thrown away.
- 2C. Direct the PHA IG to periodically review documentation supporting court appearance overtime by:
 1. Examining Court appearance documentation to assure it includes a subpoena and court notice containing in and out time postings and the DA's signature and manual time posting.
 2. Verifying that the overtime claimed by the officer on the Daily Attendance Report is supported and reasonable according to the time in and out information on the court notice.

Court Appearances (PHA Response)

As noted in the OIG Report, PHAPD has adequate procedures for managing court appearances by its officers. The problem in this particular instance, also noted in the OIG Report, was that the records maintained by PHAPD were inadvertently discarded. Accordingly, the issue raised in the OIG Report is not one of excessive overtime paid by PHAPD for court appearances; rather it is the issue of maintaining adequate records to ensure that such overtime is justified pursuant to already established PHAPD procedures.

To address this issue, the PHA has created and tasked the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office with developing, among other policies, a records management and retention policy. The policy implemented by the new PHAPD administrations requires maintenance of court appearance overtime records for a period of five (5) years. *See* Exhibit F hereto. Moreover, all PHAPD overtime, including overtime for Court appearances, must be personally approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources. *See* Exhibit D hereto

Although such procedures should ensure that overtime for court appearances is justified and able to be tracked, it is impossible to predict the amount of overtime required for court appearances. This is a result of the substantial control exercised by the City of Philadelphia District Attorney's Office in requiring PHAPD officers to make court appearances.³ However, when the District Attorney requires such court appearances, the PHAPD will now be better situated to track the officers making the appearances and the time spent.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

2B. The PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office will oversee a document maintenance and retention policy, which will, among other things, require court appearance documents related to overtime payments to be maintained for five (5) years. *See* Exhibit F hereto. In addition, all overtime for PHAPD court appearances must be personally approved by the General Manager of Human Resources.

2C. The PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office has assigned a detective and paralegal to review periodically documentation supporting court appearances by monitoring the administrative process of the Court Liaison Unit. In addition, the Court Liaison Unit has

³ The PHAPD Chief has initiated discussions with the District Attorney's office to address this issue.

been taken out of the control of the PHAPD Commander of Operations and placed under the administrative command of the PHAPD Staff Services Officer.

Furthermore, the PHA OIG will schedule a follow-up audit in its Audit Plan for fiscal year 2001 to evaluate the corrective actions taken by the PHAPD on overtime. The PHA OIG audit will include reviews of the DARs and other records as is necessary to justify and document PHAPD overtime charges.

Processing Arrests (OIG)

In the event PHAPD officers are involved in an arrest, they process the arrest through a Philadelphia District Police Station. PHAPD police involvement in processing arrests resulted in significant overtime. Overtime incurred in processing arrests represented 11 percent, or \$14,757, in our overtime sample. PHAPD officers did not enter data on control documents to show the time spent in processing arrests and PHAPD supervisors failed to enforce this reporting requirement. As a result, the PHAPD lacked documentation to monitor officer performance and support the reasonability of the time spent by officers in processing arrests.

For any arrest, complaint or service requiring police action, the officer prepares an incident report Form 75-48. The 75-48 requires the officer to enter various facts about the incident. The 75-48 also requires the officer to record on the form the time out, which is the time the officer goes off duty to process the incident, and the time-in, which is the time the officer finishes processing the arrest or complaint. The arrest processing takes place at a City District Police Station. Often, the time used to process the incident goes beyond the officer's normal work hours and results in overtime. The officers submit the incident reports to their supervisors for review. The incident report will show how much time was taken by the District to process the arrest. The supervisor can use the incident report to establish the accuracy and reasonableness of the overtime claimed by the officer on the DAR.

Our review of incident reports showed that the officers responsible for completing the reports rarely entered their time-in when they finished processing the arrest. The officers disregarded entering this data and the PHAPD supervisors, responsible for oversight, did not enforce this reporting requirement. Consequently, data, useful for monitoring officer performance and supporting overtime, was unavailable.

Our review of the overtime incurred by officers for arrest processing showed that it varied widely from officer to officer. We found instances where the processing of an arrest took three hours, while the processing of another arrest took over eight hours. We wanted to learn why there were wide differences in processing times, and if the processing times claimed on the DARs could be supported. Because processing times were not entered on the incident reports, we could not use the reports to confirm the arrest processing overtime claimed by officers. As an alternative,

we reviewed City police department information regarding PHAPD arrest processing. We wanted to learn the time when the arrest processing for an incident was completed. The City police department told us that the slate time, or booking time, was the time that the arrest processing was completed and that shortly after the slate time, the officer should have reported back on duty at the PHAPD.

We asked the City police department for slating time information for 25 arrests on which PHAPD officers made 63 charges for overtime. In each case, the overtime for processing the arrest exceeded seven hours. City police department staff said that, typically, one officer is sufficient to process an arrest. It was unusual for more than two since only the officers who have important testimony for processing by the City police department detective are necessary to stay through the end of processing. However, we found occasions when as many as four PHAPD officers charged overtime to process one arrest.

City police department staff said that giving consideration for administrative chores, it was reasonable to expect an officer to return to duty within one and half hours of the slating time. Even after allowing officers three hours from slate time for other administrative requirements, we found 18 of the 63 instances in our sample where the officer claimed overtime on the DAR that was more than three hours after the slate time. No justification was given by the officers for taking so long to return to service. Further, since the slating information was not provided to PHAPD supervisors, they would not have arrest processing completion times to compare to the overtime claimed in the DAR.

Recommendations (OIG):

We recommend the PHA through its PHAPD:

- 2D. Assure officers are meeting their responsibility for preparing complete incident reports, including information showing the time-out, (when they went off duty to process an arrest), and the time-in, (when the officer came back on duty after completing arrest processing).
- 2E. Direct officers through directives or other means, to obtain copies of the City police department slating reports and to submit the slating reports with their incident reports to their supervisors at the close of arrest processing. Instruct supervisors that they should not authorize officer overtime for arrest processing unless the overtime claimed is supported by incident reports and slating reports.
- 2F. Require PHAPD supervisors to monitor incident reports and slating reports to assure the time spent to process an arrest and the number of PHAPD officers doing the processing is appropriate.
- 2G. Hold supervisors accountable for implementing the arrest processing overtime controls.

Processing Arrests (PHA Response)

The present PHA administration has tasked the PHAPD to establish protocols and procedures to ensure that officers prepare complete incident reports, including providing information showing their time-out and time-in. This process is being undertaken by the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office.

Significantly, the OIG Report references “slating” time to gauge when an officer should return to duty after an arrest, and cites a City PD officer for the proposition that an officer should return to duty within approximately one hour of the “slating time.” However, there is not enough information in the OIG Report to respond adequately to that statement. Arrests for different types of crimes trigger different arrest and slating procedures. There are arrests modes for “summary” offenses, which require the officer to transport the offender to the Police District for identification, for the possible want, and the preparation of the summary citation.

On arrival at the Police District, the citation and offender are “booked” (slated) into the arrest system. This procedure normally takes less than two hours from the moment of arrest until “slating time.” However, many variables effect the slating time, including:

1. Availability of transportation of the offender from the scene of arrest to the District of occurrence;
2. Availability of information (wanted file);
3. A “hit” on the offender indicating he/she is wanted; and
4. Backlog of arrests and processing.

Arrests for indictable offenses will increase the amount of “out of service” time due to a more involved process. In addition to the procedures outlined above for indictable cases, a City PD Detective initiates an investigation into the crime. Usually the patrol officers are interviewed by the Detective first, and later released. However, certain arrests involve more

complicated procedures. For example, an arrest for the possession of a weapon requires that the officer give an interview, prepare a property receipt for the weapon, transport the weapon to the City PD Headquarters, and have the weapon logged into the City PD ballistics section. The officer then has to return to his or her area of assignment, or if appropriate, report off duty.

The above is only a limited example; other types of arrests (homicides, assaults, etc.) can create a different, more complex set of circumstances, which may increase slating time.

Recommendation (PHA Response):

2D-2G. PHA will develop a work plan and implement the recommendations set forth in the OIG Report. In addition, PHAPD will develop a centralized PHAPD records management division that will maintain all incident reports and supplemental records of the PHAPD. Moreover, the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office will undertake regular, random audits of the arrest paperwork turned in to the PHAPD records management division.

Chief Special Assignments (OIG)

The DAR's for a few officers contained the overtime category "Chief Complaints". Eleven percent, or \$14,684, of our overtime sample involved "Chief Complaints". This overtime category pertained to a special investigations unit that was run solely by the former Chief of the PHAPD. The officers working on the special unit received considerable overtime. For example, the four officers most active in the special investigations unit during 1996 averaged 52, 52, 37 and 33 hours of overtime per week.

The special investigations unit was accountable only to the Chief. Because of the confidentiality surrounding this special unit, only the Chief was aware of the officers' assignments and the hours they spent while working the special assignments. Even senior PHAPD officials said they did not know what the officers on the special unit were doing. All the oversight and accounting for the officers time, including overtime, was handled by the Chief. However, the former Chief did not leave records to explain how the special assignments related to PRA and housing activities or to substantiate the time charged by officers in this unit.

There was no provision in PHAPD policies and procedures authorizing senior PHAPD officials to administer clandestine cases which were outside the oversight controls governing regular PHAPD cases and operations. Further, in our view, all records relating to any

case worked by PHAPD officers should be maintained as part of normal record keeping unless the PHAPD official can document a compelling reason why the records need to be segregated.

After considerable searching, PHAPD personnel were able to find documentation to explain the work done by the special unit for approximately 20 percent of the overtime in our "Chief's Complaints" sample. This documentation indicated the overtime pertained to incidents that were PHA related. The PHAPD could not support the purpose of the remaining 80 percent of overtime paid to the special unit officers.

Recommendations (OIG):

We recommend the PHA assures that the PHAPD:

- 2H. Adopts a control directing the Chief to justify all confidential assignments opened by the PHAPD which would cause access to information developed during the assignment to be limited or restricted.
- 2I. Establishes a policy explaining how to handle records produced during a confidential assignment. The policy should address who maintains the records including the time and attendance records, and how and when those records will be incorporated into the regular PHAPD system of records after completion of the special assignment.

Chief Special Assignments (PHA Response)

The issues raised in the OIG report are moot, as the "Chief Complaints" unit has been disbanded. Moreover, all PHAPD overtime requests now must receive pre-approval by the PHA General Manager for Human Resources.

PHAPD Participation in Law Enforcement Task Forces (OIG)

The PHAPD participated in task force initiatives with State and Federal law enforcement organizations such as the Federal ATF, the DEA, and the State BNI. The stated objective of participating in the task forces was to enable the PHA to obtain greater resources in its efforts to reduce both drugs and weapons in public housing. Eight percent, or \$10,834.39, of our overtime sample dealt with participation in law enforcement task forces. The PHAPD had little documentation to support the time spent by its officers while assigned to these task forces and to explain the relationship some task forces had to PHA operations. Because controls over task force participation were so weak, \$86,000 in reimbursements to which the PHA was entitled from the State of Pennsylvania for overtime that was worked were not sought.

Lacking acceptable records at the PHA, we reviewed the records maintained by the various task forces in which the PHAPD participated to confirm the accuracy of the few records that were available at the PHA. We noted some inconsistencies:

- One task force maintained records on a case in which participating officers made a highway stop. The suspect fled and there was no indication that other work was done on this case. Although the officers making the stop were not identified as being PHAPD, we found two housing officers making several overtime claims for this case.
- PHAPD records showed that its officers received overtime for working with a task force on the same day the task force records showed the officers took the day off. This type of discrepancy occurred four times.
- PHAPD records reported two officers working with a task force the same day that the task force's records showed the officers were working at the PHA.

Generally, the PHAPD lacked complete and accurate records on its task force participation. Even case numbers were incomplete or erroneous and hampered our efforts to gain or verify information. Because PHAPD task force personnel were out stationed, reported attendance only occasionally, and lacked adequate supervision, inaccurate and incomplete record keeping continued unabated. The PHAPD did not seek to obtain from the lead task force agency, copies of daily attendance reports or similar documents to corroborate with the officer attendance.

Because of the incomplete and inaccurate records, the PHAPD could not document that certain task force assignments related to PHA operations, i.e., Camden, New Jersey and Norristown, Pennsylvania. There was no information available to explain how these task force activities were directly related to the safety and security of the PHA's residents. PHAPD supervisors said their former Chief of Police approved these task force details, but they could not explain how the officers operating in these non-PHA locations benefited the PHA's tenants.

In a related matter we noted that the PHAPD participated in a drug elimination task force led by the State of Pennsylvania's Office of Attorney General, Bureau of Narcotics Investigation (BNI), from 1991 through 1996. The focus of the joint task force was the elimination of drugs in public housing. The PHAPD's joint agreement with the State provided that the State would reimburse the PHAPD for the overtime worked by approved PHAPD task force members. During 1995 and 1996, the PHAPD received \$109,158 from BNI in overtime reimbursements for its task force participation. However, because of its lack of effective management controls and the absence of recordkeeping for overtime worked by its officers, it missed out on at least \$86,000 of additional State reimbursements.

State reimbursement procedures provided that overtime would only be reimbursed for approved task force members and only for the number of officers required for the operation. The overtime hours had to be pre-approved by State officials, and the PHAPD had to request the reimbursement. The State would not reimburse the overtime hours of officers who were not approved for the task force or pay the overtime for more officers than they requested for an

operation. Our sample included 13 PHAPD officers who the State approved for the task force. They made up approximately 10 percent of all the PHAPD personnel assigned to this task force. Also, there were three other PHAPD officers in our sample who charged for task force overtime although they had not been approved for the overtime. Our review of the time sheets for the 13 approved officers, showed that the PHAPD did not seek reimbursement from the State for at least \$86,000 in overtime to which it was entitled. The \$86,000 in unclaimed overtime would have come from State resources and could have been used to further tenant safety and security.

Recommendations (OIG)

We recommend the PHA:

- 2J. Establish management controls to guide its participation in the task forces. The controls should address the procedures the PHAPD will use to assign PHAPD officers to the task force, and account for each officers time on the task force and periodically reconciling PHAPD time records with task force time records.
- 2K. Advise its task force partners that PHAPD officers can only participate in cases and operations that directly relate to PHA locations and activities.
- 2L. Assure that the PHAPD case file fully explains the nexus that any task force operation has if it is going to take place away from PHA locations. All conditions pertaining to the PHAPD's participation in the task force should be stipulated in a Memorandum of Understanding executed with the other law enforcement organization.
- 2M. Assure that task force cooperative agreements include requirement that the lead agency maintains records showing the assignments and hours charged by PHAPD personnel. Request the task force lead agency to furnish the PHAPD the assignment and time reports for PHAPD officers who are on detail to the task force.
- 2N. Establish a procedure whereby before approving the time charges of the task force officer, the responsible PHAPD supervisor must corroborate the time claimed by the officer in the PHAPD DAR to the independent time records supplied by the task force lead agency. Assure, the supervisor reconciles any differences and follows up and holds officers accountable for correcting discrepancies.

PHAPD Participation in Law Enforcement Task Forces (PHA Response)

PHAPD's participation in State and Federal law enforcement task forces provide tangible benefits for PHA residents, whether the task forces' emphasis is on PHA property or on nearby neighborhoods. For example, many of the task forces in which PHAPD officers have been involved relate to drug enforcement and elimination programs, the results of which directly impact PHA residents. Although the PHAPD is only participating in one task force at present, in connection with which it has entered into a "Standard State and Local Task Force Agreement" with the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") (*see* Exhibit G hereto), it is conceivable that PHAPD officers will be involved in other State and Federal task forces in the future for the benefit of PHA residents. However, such task forces will be entered into with a clear understanding of project objectives and purpose, similar to the DEA task force agreement.

In prior administrations there was little oversight over PHAPD officers' participation in task force initiatives with State and Federal law enforcement organizations. Pursuant to the systemic management changes implemented elsewhere by Mr. Greene, the present administration also has implemented a policy to reduce the administrative problems associated with PHAPD participation in State and Federal task forces. Specifically, the State or Federal agency to which a PHAPD officer is assigned reviews and signs the PHAPD officer's DAR. This control will allow PHA to recover reimbursement costs from State and Federal agencies so that PHA operating funds can be used to provide residents with core services.

Historically, overtime has also been a problem associated with PHAPD participation in State and Federal task forces. The present PHA administration had, prior to receiving the OIG Report, implemented a policy providing that PHAPD overtime will not be issued unless approved by the PHA General Manager of Human Resources. *See* Exhibit D

hereto. Accordingly, the overtime payments associated with PHAPD participation in task forces in past administrations will be significantly reduced.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

2J-2N. The PHA will consider and investigate the feasibility of implementing the OIG Report recommendations. In addition, PHA has already implemented a system for ensuring reimbursement from State and Federal agencies for PHAPD participation in task force assignments. The policy provides for the participating agency to review, and sign off on, the PHAPD officer's signed DAR. Moreover, all PHAPD overtime requests associated with State or Federal task forces are required to receive pre-approval by the PHA General Manager for Human Resources.

Payments for Unidentified Overtime Charges (OIG)

Apart from the documentation problems we found for the overtime that was categorized by purpose, the purpose of 22 percent of the overtime, which amounted to \$30,321 (the largest part of our sample), was not documented by the PHAPD. This occurred because PHAPD supervisors did not have to identify the purpose of overtime on the DAR. In fact, there were no instructions on what and how to enter any of the elements on the DAR.

Even without a PHAPD policy, most supervisors documented the purpose of overtime. We found some supervisors listing the purpose of officer overtime on the DAR, daily roster lists, and overtime logs. However, PHAPD supervisors were not consistent in how and where they identified the purpose of officer overtime. Lacking information about the purpose of overtime, there is no assurance that the overtime use was appropriate and the amount of overtime claimed by the officer was reasonable.

Recommendation (OIG):

- 2P. We recommend the PHA develop and implement a policy explaining the purpose of the DAR, the information to be entered on the DAR, and how the DAR is to be used by PHAPD supervisors. This policy should include the administrative requirements for entering on the DAR the amount and purpose of officer overtime. Also, include instructions for preparing related documents that support overtime charges, such as the daily roster lists and overtime logs, to assure the forms are prepared and used consistently between supervisors.

Payments for Unidentified Overtime Charges (PHA Response)

In prior PHAPD administrations there was a lack of uniformity in the way supervisors documented some overtime expenditures. The PHA has tasked the present PHAPD management with reviewing this practice and implementing a uniform system for recording overtime.

Recommendation (PHA Response):

2P. The PHAPD will develop and implement a policy explaining the purpose of the DAR, the information to be entered on the DAR, and how the DAR is to be used by PHAPD supervisors. This policy will include administrative requirements for entering the amount and purpose of officer overtime, as well as instructions for preparing related documents that support overtime charges, such as the daily roster lists and overtime logs.

In addition, since 1998 the PHAPD has required pre-approval for all overtime and compensatory time earned by PHAPD employees. See Exhibits D and E hereto. This form requires justification for each hour of overtime and compensatory time worked. The form is signed by Command Staff Personnel and then forwarded to the Executive Office.

Supervisory Compensatory Time (OIG)

According to the PHA's personnel policy, PHAPD supervisors are entitled to compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay for extra hours worked. Our sample included 234.5 hours of compensatory time claimed by supervisory staff. Similar to our review of PHAPD officer overtime, we requested the PHAPD to provide information for our sample to explain the purpose of the compensatory time and to support the amount of compensatory time awarded to -supervisory personnel. For our sample, the PHAPD could not support the validity of 97 percent of the compensatory time claimed on the supervisors' DARs. Further, any oversight would have been ineffective since the PHAPD did not have records which could have corroborated the compensatory time claimed by supervisors.

In addition, supervisors claimed more compensatory time than they earned. The PHAPD's personnel policy stated that supervisors would receive one hour of compensatory time for each hour that was worked beyond his/her normal work day. We found occasions on which some

supervisors received excessive compensatory time by claiming one and a half hours, double time, and even as much as four hours of compensatory time for each hour beyond the normal work day. A lack of managerial oversight precluded the excessive claims for compensatory time from being detected.

Recommendations (OIG):

We recommend that the PHA:

- 2Q. Assure that all PHAPD, supervisors are aware that they receive one hour of compensatory time for each hour worked beyond the normal work day.
- 2R. Establish a PHAPD control whereby superior rank supervisors review the compensatory time claimed by subordinates to assure the time is necessary, reasonable and fully supported

Supervisory Compensatory Time (PHA Response)

The issues raised in OIG Report were the result of a lack of oversight of PHAPD supervisory personnel in prior administrations. This has been remedied by requiring pre-approval by the Executive Director for all compensatory time. *See Exhibit E hereto.* Pursuant to the Executive Director's requirement that all compensatory time be pre-approved, the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office has assigned a detective to oversee PHAPD supervisory compensatory time to ensure that adequate records are maintained and returned, and that the requirement of one hour of compensatory time per each hour of overtime work is followed. In addition, the PHA OIG has audit oversight responsibility for supervisory compensatory time.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

2Q. PHA will advise all PHAPD supervisors that they are entitled to receive only one hour of compensatory time for each hour worked beyond the normal workday, with the exception of holidays, which are credited at double compensatory time.

2R. PHA is also establishing a control, through the PHAPD Integrity and Accountability Office, so that supervisor compensatory time is subject to regular audits. In addition, since 1998 the PHAPD has required pre-approval for all compensatory time and justification for each hour worked for overtime or compensatory time.

Providing Security for Senior PHA Officials (OIG)

Two PHAPD officers were detailed to provide security and other services to the former Executive Director. However, the PHA's use of security during our audit period appeared excessive. PHAPD security for the former Executive Director extended beyond the normal work day and involved locations that did not appear related to PHA activities. Expending PHAPD resources to pay officers overtime for services unrelated to the PHA's business was wasteful and reduced the PHAPD resources available for tenant security.

The same two officers claimed overtime hours for providing personal security to the former Executive Director at locations that included his personal residence, social establishments and other non-PHA locations. Frequently, the personal security at these locations went into the early morning hours. There was no documentation to explain or justify why security was needed at the non-PHA locations that went beyond normal business hours.

The security detail contributed greatly to the overtime paid to these officers. There were many weeks when the security officers claimed and were paid more than 60 hours of overtime. There was one week when they earned in excess of 70 hours of overtime.

No one currently employed at the PHAPD could or would explain why these officers were assigned to the former Executive Director. They said the special detail was approved by the former PHAPD Chief of Police and the special detail officers only reported to the Chief. A high ranking PHAPD official said he knew the officers were "shadowing" the former Executive Director, but he did not think it was often.

The current Executive Director has one officer assigned to him for security. However, the PHAPD still lacks an overall security policy addressing issues such as: What PHA officials need security? Under what circumstance is security necessary? What is the appropriate level of security?

Recommendation (OIG):

We recommend the PHA:

- 2S. Establish a policy regarding the provision of security services for PHA employees and officials.

Providing Security for Senior PHA Officials (PHA Response)

Mr. Greene, the present Executive Director, does not have PHAPD officers assigned to him. The policy of assigning PHAPD officers to the Executive Director was maintained in the prior PHA administration, but has been extinguished by the present administration. Mr. Greene does have two non-PHAPD personnel accompany him to public appearances related solely to PHA business. Likewise, no other PHA executive is assigned PHAPD police officer protection. There is a PHAPD officer assigned to the PHA building strictly for security purposes.

However, the nature of the Executive Director's position, and that of other Executive Staff members, as well as their public exposure in sometimes volatile situations, may from time to time require security from PHAPD officers. It is anticipated that such occasions will be rare. When such a situation does arise, it will be handled on a case-by-case basis, depending upon the level of danger and immediacy of the threat. The final determination regarding PHAPD officer protection will be made by the PHA Executive Director and the PHAPD Chief.

Recommendation (PHA Response):

2S. A memorandum has been issued setting forth the policy for executive staff security. See Exhibit H hereto. Consequently, no PHAPD officers will be assigned to PHA executive staff members absent valid safety concerns and approval.

C. Payroll Computations (OIG)

The PHAPD needs to take effective measures to assure payroll computations are accurate. Payroll administration and accounting is essentially a manual process which lacks written policies and procedures. Manually calculating the weekly payroll caused frequent errors, both over- and underpayments, in the compensation paid to PHAPD officers.

The PHAPD clerks responsible for calculating payroll did not have written policies and procedures for preparing payroll, although the clerks did maintain their own notes on the various payroll provisions of the PHAPD Union Contracts. However, the individuality of the guides caused inconsistencies between clerks in their payroll computations and contributed to over- and underpayments to PHAPD personnel.

We tested 258 weekly payroll calculations for 22 PHAPD employees and found 138 (53 percent) were miscalculated. The errors caused both over- and underpayments. Individual employee miscalculations caused overpayments as high as \$700 and underpayments as high as \$351. The net effect of the errors was \$1,102 in overpayments.

The most common types of errors involved overtime coding because clerks inconsistently applied overtime rates and miscalculated shift differential hours. Further, the DAR was the clerks' source document for computing an officer's payroll. The DAR's were prepared by the officers' supervisors. However, the DAR's we reviewed contained recurrent errors that included authorizing payment for overlapping hours (whereby an officer is paid for the same work hours twice) and common math mistakes. Generally, the payroll clerks did not catch the errors in the DAR since PHAPD controls did not require clerks to verify the accuracy of DAR. Payroll clerks would take the total hours the supervisor approved on the DAR as the basis for computing an officer's payroll.

The absence of automated payroll computations hindered further the payroll calculation process. Since payroll was not automated, the payroll clerks had to prepare the weekly payroll manually. This was a very time consuming and error prone process.

Recommendations (OIG):

We recommend that you direct the PHA to:

- 2T. Develop and effect official PHAPD payroll policies and procedures and assure they apply with the provisions of applicable union contracts.
- 2U. Assure that the procedures include a control whereby the payroll clerk will review the DAR for inconsistencies and overlapping hours and verify mathematical accuracy.
- 2V. Develop an automated payroll process that will allow payroll clerks to enter DAR data to the system.
- 2W. Recover the overpayments which have been made from the affected employees and pay the amounts which are due to the employees who received underpayments.

C. Payroll Computations (PHA Response)

The PHAPD administers payroll manually, which occasionally results in relatively minor calculation errors. The PHA is in the process of investigating the upgrade of its computer system, whereby the DAR's will be processed by computer, which in turn will allow payroll calculations and coding to be performed electronically, minimizing errors. It is believed that this change will significantly decrease future calculation errors

In addition, PHA requests from the OIG a list of all PHAPD personnel who were either overpaid and underpaid as a result of possible calculation errors. Upon review and investigation of this information, PHA would seek restitution of overpayments and would pay those employees who were underpaid.

Recommendation (PHA Response):

2T-2W. PHA agrees to investigate and implement, if appropriate, the recommendations set forth in the OIG Report. The PHA is the process of investigating the upgrade of its computer system, whereby the DAR's will be processed by computer, which in turn will allow payroll calculations and coding to be performed electronically.

In addition, PHA requests from the OIG a list of all PHAPD personnel who were either overpaid and underpaid as a result of a possible calculation error.

Finding 3: Some DEG Funding Was Not Used as Intended (OIG)

Some Drug Elimination Program funding was not used to hire the additional police officers that were requested in the PHA's applications. Also, some vehicles purchased for the PHAPD were not used for their intended purpose.

Since 1993, the PHA has applied for and been awarded Drug Elimination Grant (DEG) funds. The PHA's allocation of DEG funds to the PHAPD has been relatively consistent during our audit period.

[OIG Report Graph Omitted]

We reviewed two purposes to which the PHAPD applied its DEG funds: hiring additional officers and purchasing police vehicles.

Hiring Additional Police Officers (OIG)

In 1995, the PHA requested DEG funds to hire 20 additional officers. The PHA requested funding to hire 16 officers in 1996 and in 1997 funding to hire 20 officers. The PHA's justification was that its PHAPD needed additional officers to address the level of crime in its housing developments. Although the PHA used the DEG funding allocated for new officers, there was no corresponding change in the actual number of PHAPD officers. Our review of the PHAPD personnel charged to the DEG fund account disclosed that some of these individuals had been PHAPD employees years prior to the DEG funds being awarded to the PHA.

[OIG Report Graph Omitted]

DEG funds should be used to supplement the resources the PHA used to address crime in its public housing locations and not to replace an existing level of police security. After the introduction of the DEG funded officers, the PHA tenants and HUD should have expected an increased level of security at the PHA developments. What HUD and the tenants appeared to get was a continuation of the existing level of PHAPD officer security which even declined in one of the DEG funded years.

Recommendations (OIG):

We recommend that the PHA:

- 3A. Provide a list of the additional PHAPD officers hired with DEG funds and demonstrate how the DEG funded officers supplemented existing PHAPD officer levels.

If the PHA does not demonstrate that DEG funds supplemented existing officer levels, and makes future requests of DEG funds for this purpose, we recommend that HUD direct the PHA to submit:

- 3B. Information establishing pre-DEG PHAPD officer levels and on an interim basis stipulated by HUD.
- 3C. Information evidencing the supplemental officers hired under the DEG Program.

Hiring Additional Police Officers (PHA Response)

Under the FY 1993 Drug Elimination Grant ("DEG"), the PHA hired twenty new officers, all of whom graduated from the City of Philadelphia Police Academy. Attached as

Exhibit I hereto is a list of the officers. This grant was for a two-year period. In FY 1995 and again in FY 1997, PHA received additional grants to continue to employ the officers hired in FY 1993. The PHA believed, and still believes, that the language in the grants allowed use of grant funds to continue the officers' employment.

Under the FY 1996 Drug Elimination Grant, the PHA hired sixteen officers, all of whom graduated from the City of Philadelphia Police Academy. Attached as Exhibit I hereto is a list of those officers. This grant was also for a two-year period, and in FY 1998 PHA received authorization to continue to employ those sixteen officers. The PHA believed, and continues to believe, that these funds also could be used to continue the employment of those officers. In addition, all 36 of the officers PHA hired through the DEG program performed drug elimination work, as the grants required.

As discussed in a meeting between PHA staff, counsel for PHA, and Office of Inspector General staff subsequent to the issuance of the draft report, the number of funded positions in the chart titled "Actual and Funded PHA Officers" is misstated. The number of funded officers was as follows:

Calendar Year	Total	Operating	Section 8	Comp. Grant 164	Comp. Grant 169	DEG
1995	243	150	1	46	26	20
1996	242	150	0	46	26	20
1997	258	150	0	46	26	36 ⁴

Therefore, the actual "variance" between the number of funded officers and the number of actual officers is as shown in the table below:

⁴ PHA received the approval for the additional 16 officers in December 1996, but these officers were not hired and DEG funds were not expended until February 1997.

Calendar Year	Total Funded	Total Actual	Variance
1995	243	249	(5)
1996	242	237	5
1997	258	245	13

The total actual number of officers shown in the chart above was taken directly from the OIG report.

The variance between the funded and actual number of officers was caused by two forces beyond the control of PHA. First, PHA has had tremendous difficulty recruiting and retaining qualified officers. Police departments in some of the counties surrounding Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia Police Department provide higher compensation to their officers. PHA officers therefore often seek employment with those departments after PHA has funded their training at the City of Philadelphia Police Academy.

In addition, during periods of strong economic growth, as experienced in recent years, police departments in general have had difficulty recruiting and keeping officers because of attractive alternatives in the private sector. PHA was even more susceptible to this phenomenon because it has less status in the eyes of some recruits and offered less money than many other police departments. PHA continues to have difficulty recruiting and keeping qualified officers.

PHA also maintained vacancies in its operating budget area because of shortfalls in funding by HUD. In fiscal years 1995, 1996 and 1997, PHA had funding shortfalls of 5%, 4% and 11%, respectively. To make up these shortfalls, the prior administration maintained vacancies in the PHAPD and in other areas.

Despite the recruiting and funding difficulties, PHA employed officers in the drug elimination area up to the limits of the DEG funding. If an opening arose in the DEG area, PHA

would often transfer an officer from its operating budget area to the drug elimination area because PHA viewed drug elimination as one of its highest priorities. Once an officer was transferred from the operating area to the drug elimination area on PHA financial records, that officer's duties would also change to drug elimination work. PHA therefore believes that all DEG funding was properly used for drug elimination work, as intended by the grants.

Moreover, the DEG funds were used to augment, and not to supplant the existing PHA police force. The existing force continued to perform its duties as outlined in the MOU with the City, which was a concern addressed in Finding 1 of the OIG Report, while the DEG funded officers supplemented that existing force by concentrating exclusively on drug elimination work. It is therefore PHA's belief that it used the DEG funds as intended in the grant – to supplement the existing force with officers that performed exclusive drug elimination work. While it is true that the actual number of non-DEG funded officers decreased slightly, the reasons for that decrease were outside of PHA's control.

Finally, consistent with the concerns expressed in Finding 1 of the OIG Report, the present PHA administration has begun to focus more on the provision of core services, such as maintenance at PHA facilities, while restructuring the PHAPD, which will now focus on providing "targeted" police services, such as drug elimination programs, to supplement City PD services to PHA residents.

Recommendations (PHA Response):

3A-3C. As discussed above, under the FY 1993 Drug Elimination Grant, the PHA hired twenty new officers, all of whom graduated from the Police Academy. *See* Exhibit I hereto. This grant was for a two-year period. In FY 1995 and again in FY 1997. PHA

received additional grants to continue to employ the officers hired in FY 1993. The PHA believed, and still believes, that the language in the grants allowed use of grant funds to continue their employment.

Under the FY 1996 Drug Elimination Grant, the PHA hired sixteen officers, all of whom graduated from the Police Academy. *See* Exhibit I hereto. This grant was also for a two-year period, and in FY 1998 PHA received authorization to continue to employ those sixteen officers. The PHA also believed, and continues to believe, that these funds could be used to continue the employment of those officers.

In addition, all 36 of those officers performed drug elimination work, as the grants required. While the number of core – non-DEG funded – officers did decline in fiscal years 1995 through 1997 because of recruiting and retention problems, PHA assigned officers to drug elimination work up to the limit of DEG funding. These officers supplemented the core, non-DEG funded officers, and performed the services required of the PHAPD pursuant to the MOU between the PHA and the City.

DEG Funded Equipment Purchases (OIG)

The PHA was authorized \$190,000 in 1995 DEG funds to purchase vehicles for its PHAPD patrols and operations. The PHA purchased 10 vehicles with its DEG funds. However, the former PHA administration chose not to use all the DEG funded vehicles for police business. Though we did not determine conclusively how it happened, two of the vehicles purchased with DEG funds were assigned to the PHA Executive Office from the day they were acquired. Later, the PHA executive office added a third DEG purchased vehicle. Today, the three vehicles remain at the disposal of the executive office.

The PHAPD Deputy Chief for Administration said the current administration was unaware it had three DEG funded vehicles in its fleet that belonged with the PHAPD. We informed the PHA administration about this condition and they agreed to return the three vehicles to the PHAPD.

Recommendations (OIG):

We recommend that you direct the PHA to:

- 3D. Obtain and submit to HUD a certification by its Chief of Police that the Executive Office has returned the three DEG funded vehicles to the PHAPD.
- 3E. Establish a control for its fleet management operations that recognizes restrictions in vehicles' usage as imposed by programs like DEG whereby vehicles purchased under the program must be used for that program's activities and not be used for or assigned to any other PHA operation.

DEG Funded Equipment Purchases (PHA Response)

In prior PHA administrations, PHA executives used PHAPD vehicles purchased with DEG funds. The present administration has implemented a policy providing that no PHAPD vehicles purchased with DEG funds are used by executive staff. PHA will permit the use of these vehicles only by PHAPD personnel

Recommendations (PHA Response):

3D. Attached as Exhibit J hereto is a certification by the current Executive Director of the PHA and the Chief of Police for the PHA, stating that the three DEG funded vehicles have been returned to the PHAPD

3E. PHA has assigned an employee to develop and implement a written procedure that ensures that DEG funded vehicles are utilized by Police personnel only, and tracked accordingly. See Exhibit K hereto.

**PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM**

To: Carl R. Greene, PHA Executive Director
From: Richard A. Zappile, PHA Chief of Police
Subject: Operational Plan
Re: Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department
Date: July 15, 1999

It is my intent in this memorandum to share with you my vision for the strategic implementation of Community Policing within this agency and the operational and administrative direction I wish to take this police department in the future. This proposal will be broken down into four areas of presentation and they are listed as follow:

- I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- II. PERSONAL ASSESSMENT
- III. DEPARTMENTAL OBJECTIVES
- IV. ORGANIZATION CHART

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The operational plan for the Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department being presented to you for your perusal will highlight the below listed topics as part of my vision and direction the agency will take in the future. These items of interest are listed as follow:

1) PERSONAL ASSESSMENT.

My conclusions were derived from personal interviews with various employees of the agency; both internal and external members of the PHAPD.

2) DEPARTMENTAL OBJECTIVES

There are three main objectives that will need to be implemented immediately which will supplement the goals and tasks of the overall PHAPD strategic plan. These three objectives are listed as follow:

Objective 1. Development and Implementation of a Community Policing Plan,

Objective 2: Technological Improvement.

Objective 3. Professional Development (Personnel and Organization)

3) ORGANIZATION CHART

The re-engineering of the PHAPD organization structure will enable me to quickly reach the objectives listed above along with the agency strategic goals already in place. Based on the new organization chart, there are clearer lines of direction and span of control that will enable each employee within the PHAPD to understand their role and purpose of the job.

II. PERSONAL ASSESSMENT

The Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department is not unlike any other Law Enforcement Agency, in particular the Philadelphia Police Department, because they all share the same type of problems and deficiencies that these other agencies do on a daily basis. I have found that the majority of PHAPD employees to be dedicated, professional and willing to do a good job. However, amongst even these good employees, there is lacking a clear sense of direction, purpose and understanding of the job. Some of the reasons, I have received for these deficiencies are as follow:

- 1) Poor or non-existent lines of communication amongst the ranks from Command Staff down throughout all subordinates of the department.
- 2) Communications is always supervisory dominated; whereas an officer's opinion or positive ideas to better the department were ignored or very rarely sought.
- 3) Supervisors are perceived by the officers as being very vindictive and disciplinary oriented leading them to be perceived also as an "old boy" network who are out of touch with their subordinate's needs. Based on this group opinion, the officers felt that the supervisors would not or could not make decisions either from a tactical, strategic or administrative command.
- 4) Some officers felt isolated from the department and the entire agency and with the residents they serve. Although, I was initially told that the Housing Police officers were isolated from the Philadelphia Police Department, many employees that I spoke with felt a sense of collaboration with their brother officers. However, they all expressed a concern about a perceived lack of "back-up" because of their inability to communicate directly with the Philadelphia Police Radio Room.
- 5) Many officers expressed pride in their relationships with PHA residents and spoke of problems they solved while working with the residents.
- 6) Many of the supervisors expressed a feeling of isolation from Command Staff management. Their insecure feeling stemmed from the fact that they were not given say in everyday decision making. Some of the sergeants expressed a feeling that officers were "out to get them" by going to politicians when supervisors tried to discipline them. Most of the supervisors expressed a willingness to "buy into" and make contributions to the organization. But there was not a total feeling of sincerity in that some of the supervisors stated that it is difficult to become totally committed to an organization or plan when the turnover rate of the Police Chief is relatively high. The position in the past ten (10) years existed with a short tenure thus lacking any continuity in any long term planning or continuity in leadership.
- 7) Finally, a majority of the employees I spoke too uniformly complained of the lack of technology (i.e. computers, mobile data terminals etc.) and the deteriorating conditions of their headquarters at Tasker and Richard Allen Homes. Much praise was given to the condition of the mobile fleet; especially with the new purchases of the 99 Ford Crown Vics and the restoration and the uniformity of new graphics on the older vehicles.

III. IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENTAL OBJECTIVES

(These objectives will not supercede the goals and tasks of the overall strategic plan, but will supplement them when implemented.)

A. Objective I: Development and Implementation of a Community Policing Plan

1) Development of Task.

The PHA Police Department needs to focus its' efforts on making public housing a safe place to live. Real community policing must be developed into the PHAPD philosophy of operational planning. The misconception in theory of community policing that is presently in effect now of merely assigning foot beats to some developments and mobile patrol in large geographical areas without a strategic patrol and problem solving plan in place must be eliminated. This type of random patrol strategy brings you random results.

The philosophy of community policing provides all patrol personnel within the department the philosophical and structural direction necessary to do more toward that idealistic goal of improving the overall quality of life in public housing developments. By broadening the PHA police mandate and making substantial changes that provide organizational support and encouragement for innovation on the part of the employee and by expanding the role of police work to include addressing the full range of community concerns, the philosophy of community policing gives housing police officers an expanded agenda to utilize their full range of professional talents, skills and abilities. By making that all important role shift primarily from a crime fighter to a community problem solver, not only opens up the scope of the patrol officer's job, but it changes the basic nature of the police response from an emphasis on dealing with individual crime incidents to attacking the underlying dynamics that detract from the overall quality of life in public housing developments.

2: Implementation of Task.

To accomplish this objective, several strategies will be employed.

- A. Increase and enhance co-operation and communication with the Philadelphia Police Department. This strategy will be accomplished through the establishing of an Inter-Agency Policing Strategy panel that will consist of police personnel (both PHA and City) along with site staff and resident leadership. Numerous strategy panels will be set up in the city depending on the number of police districts that are responsible for baseline services at our Developments. For example, Wilson Park and Passyunk Homes are within the confines of the 1st PPD Police District. A cluster strategy panel would be set up with the Captain of the district, PHA Staff (Police, Site Management) and the resident leadership from Wilson Park and Passyunk Homes.

- B. To reduce the resident's fear of crime.

- Pro-active efforts on the part of police officers to form true partnerships with the community, housing resources, city agencies, social service organizations and other law enforcement agencies.

Establish permanent site based policing Community Teams (foot beats, mobile cluster teams) and to reinforce these teams with other police resources to attack specific crime problems (i.e. TAG, CRASH and PHAST teams)

B. To reduce the resident's fear of crime (continued)

- Look at creative deployment plans (i.e. fall back shifts) involving the highest number of P/Os during peak crime hours.
- Re-implementing the PHAPD COMPSTAT meetings at all developments.
- Continue collaboration and support of the PHAPD/PPD Drug Task Force.
- Implement warrant apprehension program to focus on recidivist and violent offenders who may frequent PHA Developments.
- Assign personnel to the DEA and possibly ATF Task Forces in order to further extend the information the PHAPD needs to reduce the fear of crime in the developments.
- To reduce the demand for drugs through education of the youth (DARE and PAL program)
- Formulation and implementation of CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design) committee within the PHAPD to evaluate all developments, especially the Senior Citizen developments.
- Development and implementation of a PHA Citizen's Police Academy
- Implementation of a Police Cadet program for PHA residents between 18 and 21 years of age to work in conjunction with the PHAPD.
- Development and implementation of a PHA Resident Leadership Safety Council who will meet with the PHA Chief of Police regularly.
- Implementation of an 800 telephone number for narcotic and integrity issue hot line.
- Initiate state and local legislation to have Drug Free Public Housing sites.

B. Objective II: Technological Improvement

1) Development of Task.

In order for the department to proceed towards full community policing, it is imperative that the department has the equipment to analyze patterns of crime, victims, perpetrators, demographics and geography. At the present time, the PHAPD does not have the software or enough hardware to track crime for historical information for the purpose of predicting future incidents.

2) Implementation of Task

- Immediate systems evaluation required from the ISM Department on the technological needs of the PHAPD. This should include but not limited to the evaluation of a Police Administration package (CAD system, Record Management, Police Administration and Crime Mapping modules).
- Implementation of electronic transfer to the PHAPD of all calls for service received by the Philadelphia Police Department that were initiated from any PHA residence or development citywide. Permission has been granted by both Police Commissioner Timoney and Deputy Commissioner Brennan.
- Begin to develop a plan towards becoming a part of the 800 MHz system that will be in place within two (2) years for the City of Philadelphia. The PHAPD will seek to acquire a vacated old radio band (i.e. Water Department). The ultimate goal is to have Philadelphia Police Department dispatchers handle "all" PHA broadcasts when the 800MHz system is in place.
- Implementing the issuing of portable hand-held radio to all sworn personnel who will have these radios personally assigned to them.

